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Article 
Sharing the Cathedral 
RASHMI DYAL-CHAND 
Sharing is an indispensable part of American property law, often 
mediating the harsh implications of ownership rights.  Yet sharing is 
also a hidden component of this legal structure.  In both theory and 
doctrinal manifestations, sharing is overshadowed by the iconic 
property right of exclusion.  This Article argues that property law 
suffers a critical loss from its under-recognition of sharing because 
it fails to use sharing to correct distributional failures in a world of 
increasingly scarce resources.  Sharing could be the basis for 
developing a rich range of outcomes in common property disputes.  
Instead, as described by Calabresi and Melamed in their famed 
article on remedies, outcomes are tagged to exclusion in the form of 
blanket property rules and “keep out” signs.  As a result, sharing 
currently functions merely to create very narrow exceptions to broad 
rights of ownership.  To correct this failure, this Article presents a 
model for sharing as a preferred outcome in property disputes.  
Sharing as an outcome is a powerful means of addressing property 
inequalities, limiting harmful externalities, preserving efficiency, 
and harnessing the extraordinary potential of outcomes in property 
law. 
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Sharing the Cathedral 
RASHMI DYAL-CHAND* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sharing is a core feature of American property law.  Implied 
easements, such as those of prescription or estoppel, are one example.1  
They appear in the interstices of property rights, at times when the hard 
edges of ownership overly limit what parties actually want to do with their 
property.2  In such cases, courts require landowners to share their land by 
creating rights of way for use by others.3  Indeed, servitudes of many 
kinds, both those imposed by courts and those voluntarily assumed by 
owners,4 are living examples of property sharing.  So are nuisance cases, in 
which courts require owners to provide support,5 access to light,6 or even 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor, Northeastern University School of Law.  For very helpful comments, I thank Libby 
Adler, Gregory Alexander, Lee Breckenridge, Nestor Davidson, Peter Enrich, Kristin Madison, Mary 
O’Connell, Joseph William Singer, James Smith, Kara Swanson, and participants in the Property 
Works in Progress Workshop at Fordham Law School, the Association of Law, Property & Society 
Annual Meeting at the University of Minnesota Law School, and the University of Georgia School of 
Law Faculty Colloquium.  I am particularly grateful to Gregory Alexander for the opportunity to think 
hard about “progressive property” in a panel on the subject at the Law and Society Annual Meeting in 
Honolulu and to Joseph William Singer for his generous advice on the practical and theoretical 
foundations for this Article.  For his invaluable research assistance and good humor, I am very grateful 
to Jeremiah Meyer-O’Day. 
1 For examples of prescriptive easements, see Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 
584, 586–87, 590 (Cal. 1984); Houghton v. Johnson, 887 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008); 
and Algermissen v. Sutin, 61 P.3d 176, 181–84 (N.M. 2002).  For examples of easements by estoppel, 
see Pinkston v. Hartley, 511 So. 2d 168, 169–70 (Ala. 1987); Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 810 (Cal. 
1906); and Prospect Dev. Co. v. Bershader, 515 S.E.2d 291, 297–300 (Va. 1999).  See generally JON 
W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND (2013) (presenting 
an in-depth explanation of the law of easements). 
2 See infra Part II.B. 
3 See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 1, § 4:1 (“Courts are willing to graft an easement onto a land 
transaction in order to do justice in a particular case.”). 
4 Express easements and covenants originate as agreements between private parties, though they 
may of course be enforced by courts.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. note 
§§ 1.1–1.2 (2000) (defining servitudes as including easements, profits, and covenants, which are 
created by both landowners and the courts). 
5 See, e.g., Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121, 1127–28 (Cal. 1981) (holding that an 
uphill landowner had a duty of care to a downhill landowner); Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220, 
228–29 (1815) (holding that there is an obligation to provide lateral support); Friendswood Dev. Co. v. 
Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex. 1978) (finding an obligation to provide subjacent 
support). 
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in a sense, clean air.7  In copyright law, the venerated doctrine of fair use 
protects sharing.8  Future interests in estates embody sharing.9  The list of 
examples is almost endless. 
As ubiquitous as sharing is, it is decidedly not the thematic foundation 
of property law.  Instead, the conceptual opposite of sharing, exclusion, has 
that distinction.10  Although such a connection is by no means intrinsic, 
property theory has quite successfully positioned exclusion as perhaps the 
defining characteristic of property ownership.11  The consequence is an 
overarching view of property law as protecting owners by excluding non-
owners.  Both property theory and property practice appear to rely on this 
view as a presumptive means of enhancing property’s role as a stable basis 
for market transactions.12  Property theory does so by emphasizing title as 
the first-order decision in property law.13  Property practice aligns itself 
                                                                                                                          
6 Prah v. Maretti is the paradigmatic case that recognized such a right.  321 N.W.2d 182, 191 
(Wis. 1982).  Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. represents the strong majority 
rule where such a right is not recognized.  114 So.2d 357, 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). 
7 A very recent decision exploring this question is the Second Circuit’s opinion in Connecticut v. 
American Electric Power Co., in which the court held that the plaintiff states and private nonprofit 
organizations had stated a claim against the defendant power companies for harms related to climate 
change under the federal common law of public nuisance.  582 F.3d 309, 358, 366, 369, 371 (2d Cir. 
2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
8 For a paradigmatic example discussing the doctrine of fair use, which promotes the sharing of 
ideas, see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263–64, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2001).   
9 See A.W.B. SIMPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 195 (1961) 
(“[L]andowners . . . abuse[d] the power of free alienation of land, by imposing upon that land forms of 
settlement which made it impossible for their successors in title (usually their children) to deal with it 
as freely as they themselves had been able to do.”). 
10 See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68–74 (1997) (“[P]roperty rights can be fully 
explained using the concepts of exclusion and use.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to 
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730–31 (1998) (stating that the right to exclude is the “sine qua non” of 
property); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1849, 1857 (2007) (“[T]he core of property is the simple right of an owner to exclude.”); Henry E. 
Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1728 (2004) (stating that property rules 
use an “‘exclusion’ strategy”).  Professor Penner especially has acknowledged the complementarity of 
exclusion and sharing, but he argues that although it is important, sharing cannot occur without a strong 
right of exclusion.  James E. Penner, Ownership, Co-Ownership, and the Justification of Property 
Rights, in PROPERTIES OF LAW 166, 166–67 (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2006).  
11 For an influential example, see Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 1691, 1693–94 (2012), stating that “property defines things using an exclusion strategy of ‘keep 
off’ or ‘don’t touch’ and then enriches the system of domains of owner control with interfaces using 
governance strategies.”  Compelling examples of quite alternative definitions of ownership exist in 
property scholarship.  For a prominent example, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation 
Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 753 (2009). 
12 See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 10–11 (1989) (stating that 
property rights help structure and determine the economic system). 
13 SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35.  The emphasis on entitlement and ownership is so ubiquitous in 
modern property law as to appear immovable.  Indeed, even the iconic piece of legal scholarship 
questioning the pragmatic value of ownership, Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral article, began with 
the assumption that entitlements are the first-order decision.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
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with theory in much the same way.  The paradigmatic property disputes 
may well be those in which a decision about ownership determines the 
outcome and that outcome amounts to exclusion.  Adverse possession, with 
its test for deciding who has exclusive rights to a disputed property, is a 
prominent example.14 
As a result, sharing appears as the exception to the rule of exclusion.  It 
is understated, and often implicit, in its effects.  Implied easements are 
exemplary in this respect too.  They are, broadly speaking, an exception to 
trespass.  Trespass is the rhetorical darling of property law; implied 
easements have no rhetorical force.15  Similarly, even as they facilitate the 
marketability of property by policing private agreements about sharing,16 
restrictive covenants carry the rhetorical banner of being “disfavored” in 
the law.17  Affirmative covenants, which may be seen as the most 
aggressive examples of sharing within the law of servitudes, are doctrinally 
the most disfavored.18  Fair use is the exception to copyright’s monopoly.19 
Additionally, in practice, sharing appears as an exception not just to 
the rule of exclusion, but also to the right of exclusion.  It is to the sense of 
Blackstonian title that courts typically create inroads.  When courts 
recognize that enforcing rights of exclusion will derogate from the 
intentions, expectations of fairness, or sense of reliance by either or both 
                                                                                                                          
1090 (1972).  For a response to Calabresi and Melamed, arguing that even this acknowledgement does 
not adequately capture the importance of entitlements in property law, see Jules L. Coleman & Jody 
Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1347 (1986).  
14 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.12, at 78–80 (7th ed. 2007) 
(discussing adverse possession and its impact); Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1122–26 (1985) (outlining the test for adverse 
possession); Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56, 60 (1987) 
(discussing easements by prescription, the requirements of which parallel adverse possession). 
15 Merrill, supra note 10, at 747; Penner, supra note 10, at 166–67. 
16 See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF 
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 48–49, 51, 55 (1994) (discussing some of the ways restrictive 
covenants are used to police agreements and mollify parties). 
17 See, e.g., Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence Cnty. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407, 408 
(Mo. 1986) (en banc) (“It is a well-established rule that restrictive covenants are not favorites of the 
law . . . .”). 
18 See, e.g., Oceanside Cmty. Ass’n v. Oceanside Land Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (noting that precedent established that a “covenant which burdens property does not run with the 
land”); Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 164 N.E.2d 832, 834, 836 (N.Y. 1959) (explaining 
that the long-standing rule, which provided that affirmative covenants do not run with the land, was 
based on “a desire to prevent burdensome incumbrances upon title”).  The Restatement (Third) of 
Property reflects this discomfort with affirmative covenants by placing temporal limits on them.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.12(1) (2000) (“A covenant to pay money or provide 
services terminates after a reasonable time if the instrument that created the covenant does not specify 
the total sum due or a definite termination point.”). 
19 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264–68 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The 
exceptions carved out for [criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research] are 
at the heart of fair use’s protection of the First Amendment, as they allow later authors to use a 
previous author’s copyright to introduce new ideas or concepts to the public.”).   
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parties, they veer instinctively in the direction of sharing.  A striking 
example is trespass.  Time and again, courts have created exceptions to 
owners’ rights to exclude on the basis of competing rights, such as racial 
equality20 or free speech,21 or even more broadly in the name of the public 
interest.22  This too is not preordained.  Courts could leave ownership in a 
more absolute state and instead require sharing through their fashioning of 
remedies.  Thus, in trespass disputes, courts could avoid searching for an 
equal and opposing right, and instead evaluate whether the alleged 
trespasser demonstrated a need to use the owner’s property and whether 
such a need could be answered by a limited opportunity to share. 
Indeed it is somewhat ironic that courts recognize sharing by creating 
exceptions to rights rather than by more actively fashioning remedies to 
enforce sharing.  In doing so, they regularly fail to respond to the core 
problem of exclusion that they are drawn to redressing.  They may 
recognize a right of a non-owner that compels limiting the property rights 
of the owner.  But because ownership is so determinative of outcome, 
courts are terribly constrained in the remedies they can provide.  The right 
of free speech can only provide very limited opportunities to share 
property owned by another, and only when that right is compelling enough 
to overcome the owner’s property right in the first instance.23  In nuisance 
cases, even in the face of significant harm, damages may be awarded rather 
than injunctions that require the sharing of space, air, and peace when the 
offending owner exercises her rights in a manner that is deemed more 
“socially valuable.”24 
In these examples, sharing exemplifies a broader problem of 
impoverished outcomes in property law.  A glaring example is the doctrine 
of adverse possession.  While there are many cases in which the parties 
could reasonably be required to share, such as by sharing use, by leaving 
                                                                                                                          
20 See, e.g., Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 434–36 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that a salon owner could not exclude a customer based on race because doing so constituted a refusal to 
perform a contract for hair styling services); Washington v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 710 F. Supp. 
1288, 1288, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment and stating 
there was a genuine issue as to whether a store owner discriminated against the plaintiffs by refusing 
entry based on race). 
21 See, e.g., State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 628–33 (N.J. 1980) (holding that under the state 
constitution, speech could receive protection on certain private property and the university could be 
restricted from excluding students based on political speech). 
22 See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971) (“[W]e see no legitimate need for a right in 
the farmer to deny the worker the opportunity for aid available from federal, State, or local services, or 
from recognized charitable groups seeking to assist him.”). 
23 Consider, for example, the extraordinary limitations on the right of the canvassers in the famous 
Pruneyard case.  See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–84 (1980) (“PruneYard may 
restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any 
interference with its commercial functions.”). 
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) & cmt. f (1979) (discussing payment for the 
harm as a remedy rather than stopping the activity causing such harm). 
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use with the adverse possessor and the power to transfer with the “true” 
owner, or by dividing ownership over time, the remedy in these cases is 
“all or nothing”—either completely bundled ownership or ejection for the 
adverse possessor.25  In a context of increasingly scarce resources and ever 
more inequality of distribution, the blunt power of “keep out” injunctions 
leaves decisions about resource use and allocation entirely in the hands of 
private owners.26  This occurs despite the instinct of courts to achieve 
broader distribution.  Property outcomes have the potential to address acute 
problems of fairness and distributive justice to a much greater extent than 
they currently do.  By the same token, a richer palette of property 
outcomes could alleviate the harsh externalities that result from ignoring 
the uses of property made by non-owners.  It is a current and compelling 
problem in property law that the impulse to share often remains inchoate 
and, more broadly, that injunctions are often equated with “keep out” 
signs. 
This Article provides a basis for responding to the impulse to share.  
Although a rich and vibrant literature has explored the power of outcomes 
in property law,27 this Article argues that a few foundational assumptions 
undergirding this literature have obscured what would otherwise be plain.  
This literature builds upon Judge Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas 
Melamed’s famed legal realist article on remedies, which recognizes that 
the definition of a property entitlement changes markedly when it is 
assigned a value and remedied by means of a liability rule (typically in the 
form of damages or compensated injunctions) instead of a property rule 
                                                                                                                          
25 See infra Part II.B. 
26 Smith, supra note 10, at 1728. 
27 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092 (focusing on the “decisions [that] go to the 
manner in which entitlements are protected,” which “shape the subsequent relationship between the 
winner and the loser”); see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal 
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1032 (1995) (discussing the ability of 
liability rules to “catalyze consensual trade”); Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The 
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2091–93, 2096 (1997) (attempting to clarify 
“whether legal protection via a property or a liability rule should be conferred to holders of particular 
sorts of assets,” and in doing so examining the outcome of choosing one “legal rule that minimizes the 
transactional imperfections that occur in securing the transfer of assets from one person to another”); 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 713, 715, 718 (1996) (applying a “systematic economic analysis” to argue that liability 
rules are superior to property rules contrary to paradigms on property and liability rules); John A. 
Lovett, A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2005) (proposing that the “overall servitude regulation 
framework” can be improved through “three significant pliability rule refinements” to section 4.8(3) 
and an additional revision to section 4.11 of the Restatement (Third) of Property); Carol M. Rose, The 
Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2175–77 (1997) (arguing that the interplay between 
remedies and entitlements is deeply influenced by the common law context—of torts, contracts, or 
property—in which that interplay is embedded); Smith, supra note 10, at 1728 (arguing that property 
rules are, in general, superior to liability rules as a consequence of property’s exclusion strategy). 
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(typically in the form of an injunction or the denial of liability).28  Even the 
most rhetorically Blackstonian vision of property ownership can look a 
good deal less absolutist and a good deal more relational when remedied 
by something less than an injunction to keep out.29  
What the literature does not dwell on is the potential for property 
injunctions to achieve sharing.  Using a vantage point provided by another 
realist, Oliver Wendell Holmes,30 this Article explores that potential.31  By 
adapting a basic prescription propounded by Holmes largely in the realm 
of contract law,32 this Article develops a model for enhancing property 
outcomes and, in particular, for promoting sharing as a preferred outcome 
in core doctrinal areas, such as those involving claims of nuisance, adverse 
possession, implied easements, and trespass.  The model is intended for use 
in cases where legitimate interests to disputed property exist on more than 
one side of the dispute.  In such cases, a determination of title should not 
be determinative of outcome.  The model provides a basic template for 
evaluating the legitimate interests of parties in a dispute over property, not 
initially for the purpose of determining rights, but rather to pursue an 
outcome involving sharing.  By doing so, the Article argues, legal decision 
makers can produce a much richer range of outcomes. 
This Article advances two central claims, one theoretical and one 
pragmatic, followed by a prescription.  It is organized accordingly.  First, 
at the level of theory, it matters a great deal whether property law is 
grounded in a sharing model or in a model focused on exclusion.  A system 
of property law that relies on exclusion orients attention toward the 
question of which one party has formal title, and away from an inquiry into 
what interests underlie any given dispute over property.  The result often is 
                                                                                                                          
28 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1106–1110 (discussing the effects of shifting from 
a property rule to a liability rule). 
29 See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 1–5 (2003) 
(explaining that the idea of property remains grounded in the notion of sacrosanct monopolies held by 
the owner when in reality property is regulated, albeit more or less in certain instances).  Compare 2 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (stating that property allows for total exclusion of others), 
with JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 6–18 (2000) (stating that 
the current ownership model is “misleading and morally deficient” because it conceives a condition in 
which a property owner believes she can use her property without regards to others when in fact 
property is subject to governmental regulation).  
30 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173–74 
(1920) (providing a pragmatic perspective when comparing eminent domain and wrongful conversion 
by inquiring, “[w]hat significance is there in calling one taking right and another wrong from the point 
of view of the law?”). 
31 I should note here that there are other powerful frameworks for exploring exactly this issue.  
For an example of a framework besides the ownership model, see AJ VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN 
THE MARGINS 12–15 (2009). 
32 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 215 (45th prtg. 1923).  In Part II.C, I 
discuss in detail this two-part prescription, in which Holmes proposes to allocate a remedy on the basis 
of defining a group by a common set of facts.  
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that the party who is judged to have title wins a broad “keep out” 
injunction, and it is more difficult to think of solutions that require sharing 
even if those solutions ought to be evident.  Although examples of sharing 
are all around us, our over-focus on the exclusion model makes it hard for 
us to see their ubiquity, pervasive quality, and importance to our system of 
law.  Moreover, the particular focus of this Article is that over-reliance on 
the exclusion model limits our imagination in developing superior 
outcomes in property disputes that have the potential to protect more 
legitimate interests in valued resources. 
Part II develops this claim first by examining an alternative to an 
exclusion model that existed (perhaps surprisingly) in medieval times.  At 
a basic level, the medieval system of writs in property law focused directly 
on outcome and on property use, paying scant attention to who had formal 
title.33  As ownership developed into the adjudicatory starting point in 
property law, however, the sharing inherent in the medieval writ system 
was replaced by a model centering on exclusion.34  As Part III then 
discusses, by recognizing the importance of outcomes in property law, 
Calabresi and Melamed and the many scholars who so creatively built 
upon their work could have reclaimed sharing as a critical component of 
property law.  But partly because they accepted the predominance of title 
over outcome, and partly because they equated title with exclusion, they 
ignored the potential for injunctions in property disputes to accommodate 
sharing.  To explore this potential as a theoretical matter, Part IV then 
presents an alternative theoretical framework for an outcome-focused 
approach grounded in the Holmesian view of the law through a “bad 
man’s” eyes.  Finally, Part V explicates and develops the model proposed 
here, the “interest-outcome approach,” discussing both the theoretical 
grounding and the pragmatic potential of the model to better resolve core 
property disputes. 
Second, as a pragmatic matter, this Article claims that in core doctrinal 
areas, courts express the quite respectable instinct to require property 
sharing.  But because they lack the vocabulary and remedial building 
blocks to prioritize sharing as a practice and norm, they miss opportunities 
to develop outcomes in property disputes that would require sharing.  This 
is true despite the fact that in many such disputes sharing solutions would 
be superior, both from a fairness and efficiency standpoint, to the “winner 
takes all” kinds of outcomes that prevail in a system grounded in the 
exclusion model.  Think again of adverse possession:  courts recognize the 
right of the adverse possessor to use an owner’s property, effectively 
recognizing that sharing is occurring, but they remedy the situation by 
                                                                                                                          
33 SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 34–35. 
34 See id. at 35 (stating that today title is rooted in possession, which by nature means exclusion). 
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giving the adverse possessor either full ownership or nothing.  One striking 
feature of these cases is that at some point in the courts’ inquiry, the 
instinct to protect and direct sharing is formalistically cabined by the 
pressure to find “the owner.”  As a result, more parties lose than is 
necessary or normatively desirable.  A second result is that we have an 
underdeveloped range of outcomes in property disputes. 
The heart of this Article is its presentation of a model that provides 
both a modern and specific template for enriching outcomes in property 
law and, in particular, for promoting property sharing.  In developing and 
applying this model, Part IV turns from critique to prescription.  By 
reviewing the cases discussed in Part III through the lens of Holmes’s “bad 
man,” Part IV considers the much broader range of legitimate interests at 
play and outcomes that could have been achieved.  Relying in part on 
negotiation theory, which prioritizes “interests” over “positions;” in part on 
Holmes’s exploration of an outcome-first approach in contract law; and in 
part on recent scholarship that disassembles the concept of ownership, Part 
IV develops the interest-outcome approach.  As this Part demonstrates, by 
no means does the model dispose entirely of the inquiry into entitlement.  
Instead, the model elaborates on the ways in which property use in 
particular can elucidate a range of outcomes. 
By concentrating scholarly attention on property interests and 
outcomes, this Article challenges us to recognize what courts implicitly 
acknowledge all the time:  property sharing is integral to property law.  But 
sharing is also an inchoate feature of our system, with far more potential 
than has thus far been fulfilled.  By proposing a sharing model for property 
law, which would require surprisingly small adjustments in key doctrinal 
areas, this Article presents a means for fulfilling some of that potential.  As 
the experiences of so many courts show, what stands in the way of these 
adjustments is rhetoric more than substance.  By promoting property 
sharing as an outcome, this Article seeks to expand a middle space 
between exclusive ownership and a commons.  Property sharing can be a 
very modern means of addressing distributional concerns.  We need only 
follow the instincts of judges to learn how. 
II.  SHARING AS OUTCOME?  FROM WRITS TO REALISTS 
This Part demonstrates how and why sharing is fundamental to 
property law by explicating the connection between sharing and remedies.  
In short, when a property law system is focused on outcomes in any given 
dispute, it is more likely to recognize opportunities to share.  On the other 
hand, such opportunities are obscured when the system is focused on the 
question of who has proper title, because the imperative then is to ensure 
full protection of that title by granting broad rights to exclude. 
To elucidate what it means to focus on outcomes, this Part presents 
two examples of systems that have done just that, one historical and the 
 2013] SHARING THE CATHEDRAL 657 
other theoretical.  Section II.A briefly describes the early writ system, in 
which property disputes were resolved not by declaring rights of 
ownership, but rather by determining who ought to receive possession of 
the land in dispute.  By separating the question of title and possession, the 
early writ system had an inherent mechanism for sharing that was lost 
when the early writs were replaced with claims of ownership.  Sections 
II.B and II.C then turn to an ongoing discussion in property theory about 
the relationship between property rights and remedies, which builds on 
Calabresi and Melamed’s famous legal realist article.  The purpose of these 
sections is to further explore the relationship between property outcomes 
and property sharing.  One way to pose the central question in these 
sections is this:  Why are outcomes so limited in property law?  More 
specifically, to what extent can property theory explain the relatively 
limited use of injunctions other than as blunt instruments of exclusion?   
The answer, as Section II.B discusses, appears to be that a very 
influential literature on property outcomes has provided a powerful 
explanation for the centrality of exclusive ownership in property disputes, 
namely that exclusion is the basis for efficient market transactions.  Section 
II.C discusses an alternative legal realist approach to property outcomes, 
propounded by Holmes, that makes ownership much more marginal.  
Finally, Section II.D proposes a new approach to enriching the link 
between sharing and outcomes.  This approach, the interest-outcome 
model, draws on features of the early writ system, Holmes’s framework, 
and more modern progressive property scholarship to capitalize on the 
benefits of sharing that inhere in an outcome-focused approach. 
The remainder of this Article is intended to demonstrate both the 
feasibility and the intuitive appeal of the interest-outcome framework.  By 
reconnecting with the early writ system’s comfort with sharing, the 
interest-outcome approach better explains important features of existing 
doctrine and, more importantly, expands the range of potential outcomes 
that promote legitimate interests and protect important values in our legal 
system. 
A.  Real-Actions in the Early Common Law:  A Question of Seisin 
The notion that shared outcomes, rather than title, could be the primary 
focus in resolving legal disputes is not new.  Indeed, the common law 
system of writs providing rights of actions to real property operated by 
defining rights implicitly and within the context of explicitly defining 
remedies.35  The operative legal concept in these writs was that of 
                                                                                                                          
35 See CHARLES DONAHUE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 92–94 (2d ed. 1983) (looking at the right of 
entry); SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 34–43 (“[I]t is never quite clear whether the rules of law were 
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possession.36  The writs functioned fundamentally to protect the claim of 
better possession.37  It was also, therefore, the proof of better possession 
that led to success in such actions.38  The focus on possession rather than 
ownership created a natural space for sharing.  Indeed, the entire feudal 
hierarchy rested on a system of shared interests in land.39 
The paradigmatic example is the assize of novel disseisin, in which the 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant “unjustly and without judgment hath 
disseised him of his freehold,” resulting in a command to the sheriff to 
cause “that tenement to be re-seized.”40  The writ required the plaintiff to 
have been in possession of the land earlier than the defendant,41 but it does 
not appear to have required any claim of right to the land—leave alone any 
claim of “proprietorship” or anything akin to absolute ownership.42  As 
described by Professor Simpson, “[w]hatever the real action, the end 
product is the same.”43 
The point of the writ appears, more than anything, to have been to 
provide immediate relief to a party who believed himself44 unjustly 
dispossessed of land.45  The immediacy of remedy alleviated the 
difficulties that ensued when the dispossessed party engaged in self-help to 
regain possession of the land.46  In a very real sense, the question of who 
had greater rights to the land was simply too abstract and extraneous to the 
dispute to matter much.  The plaintiff sought the court’s attention 
principally because he sought possession, not because he sought a 
declaration, adjudication, or opinion about whether the land was rightfully 
                                                                                                                          
sanctioned by an appropriate procedure, or whether the rules were developed to explain the existing 
procedure; the truth no doubt in many cases was that law and procedure grew together.”).  For a 
differing view on the origins and functions of these writs that focuses more on the integration of 
substance and process to solve legal problems, see S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
COMMON LAW 119–32 (1969). 
36 DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 93 (“In the twelfth century, the concept of seisin was 
virtually identical to actual (or de facto) possession.”). 
37 See SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35–37 (“For many purposes seisin and possession need not be 
distinguished . . . . In the writ of right it is not ownership of land, but seisin of land, which is 
sought . . . .”).  
38 DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 93. 
39 Id.; SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35–37. 
40 ANTHONY FITZ-HERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM 177 (9th ed. 1794). 
41 See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92 (emphasizing possession of the land); SIMPSON, 
supra note 9, at 35–37 (“[T]he person who can base his title upon the earliest seisin is best entitled to 
recover seisin.”). 
42 DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92. 
43 SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35.  Similarly, as described by Professors Donahue, Kauper, and 
Martin, “[t]he question of ultimate right never came up.”  DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 93. 
44 This Section uses the male pronoun to acknowledge the historical context.  The remainder of 
the Article will use gender inclusive pronouns. 
45 SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 28–29. 
46 See id. at 30 (discussing how a dispossessed party only had four days to engage in self-help and 
after that time the party had to seek a remedy by bringing a writ of right). 
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his.47  Obviously, the feudal system of land tenure quite meaningfully 
diluted the ultimate question of right,48 but by no means did it have to 
dilute it entirely.  Greater, though not ultimate, title could have driven the 
outcome.  It could also have symbolized interests and consequences 
beyond that of possession, as indeed happened over time as new writs 
developed.49  Under the early writ system, it did neither.  Instead, plaintiffs 
focused directly on the ultimate question of outcome in the form of 
immediate possession. 
But it was not just in the arguably unique context of seeking immediate 
possession that the focus on outcome was evident.  For example, the writ 
of right, though closer in aim to an action for a declaration of right of 
ownership, focused on the same question of seisin and the same scope of 
proof.  Thus, as Simpson has discussed, it would be misleading to describe 
this and other real actions of that time as addressing the question of 
proprietorship.50  Indeed, despite its name, it would even be misleading to 
describe the writ of right as primarily addressing questions of right.  The 
focus, as with the other writs of that era, was on the desired outcome of 
access to and use of land even while that land was, in important respects, 
shared with others. 
As Simpson and others have described, the writ system developed in 
such a way as eventually to emphasize title over outcomes.51  Simpson 
attributes this development to the difficulty of using the older writs just 
described.52  They evolved over time into technical and complicated 
devices that, contrary to their original straightforward intent and function, 
became unwieldy and inefficient to use.53  New forms of action, such as 
actions in trespass and for ejectment, developed in their stead, providing 
means of recovering land that were capable of easier proof and more 
efficient administration.54 
Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, there is a feature 
about these new actions that appears to have been incidental rather than 
                                                                                                                          
47 See id. at 35 (“In the writ of right it is not ownership of land, but seisin of land, which is sought, 
and the same is true of novel disseisin at the other end of the scheme of writs.”).  
48 See EDGAR BODENHEIMER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 42–43 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing writs in the thirteenth century that were concerned not only 
with establishing a right, but also with regaining possession of land). 
49 SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35–36. 
50 Id. at 35. 
51 See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94–96 (describing the transformation of the writ system 
to focus on the legalistic concept of title). 
52 SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 39–41.  
53 See id. at 39–42 (explaining how the law of seisin grew to be a complicated body of law); see 
also DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94–95 (describing seisin as “transform[ing] . . . from a simple 
concept to a virtual mystery”). 
54 See SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 42 (describing the development of trespass and other personal 
actions). 
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fundamental to their ascendance.  Though disputed, Professor Holdsworth 
has described these newer actions as replacing the older focus on better 
possession with a notion of absolute ownership.55  What became important 
was for the plaintiff to prove his right of ownership (and the defendant’s 
defect in title).56  Such proof would entitle the plaintiff to broad injunctive 
relief rather than the more limited opportunity to possess, the latter of 
which was constrained both temporally and by the rights of use of others 
under the older system of writs.57  In the course of this transformation, 
remedies were relegated to a secondary level of inquiry intended to protect 
those rights, namely the more absolute rights of ownership that judges 
determined to be worthy.58 
Following this view of the ascendance of the new forms (of trespass 
and ejectment) over the old (of seisin), it appears that it was not 
considerations of more efficient resource allocation and management that 
resulted in a more absolute understanding of ownership.  Rather, it was 
perhaps, more than anything, the problem of proof.59  Proof of ownership 
was easier to produce than proof of better or more worthy possession.60  
Proof of ownership did not require evidence of use, productivity, length of 
tenure, or even possession.  Over time, it simply required a statement 
concerning title.61  Moreover, it resulted in much less potential for 
conflicting claims of right or interest because ownership, unlike 
possession, was treated in a hierarchical manner.62   Although the early 
writs very often gave possession just to one party, it was possible for two 
parties to have equal rights of possession.63  But title was a question of 
exclusivity.64  Ownership thus became a much more crystalline means of 
                                                                                                                          
55 7 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 63–64 (2d ed. 1937). 
56 Id. 
57 DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94. 
58 See id. (“[T]he law concerning the title to land was ‘elaborated to serve the needs of policy and 
justice,’ and, since seisin lay at the root of all title, the concept was correspondingly refined, modified 
and elaborated.” (quoting SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 38)). 
59 See SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 42 (“[T]he real actions did become grossly unsatisfactory.  In the 
fifteenth century considerable use was made of trespass and other person actions to try title to land.”). 
60 See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92 (explaining that the burden of proof was difficult in 
an action for writ of entry which led to the development of other actions that focused on the question of 
title).   
61 SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 42. 
62 Compare DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94 (discussing the “relativistic nature” of seisin), 
with id. at 96 (noting that seisin was replaced with a “notion of absolute ownership”), and SIMPSON, 
supra note 9, at 42 (discussing the ascendance of the concept of “best title”). 
63 See SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35 (explaining that “any person who acquires seisin acquires 
thereby a title,” thus suggesting that two people could have established title to the same land). 
64 See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 55, at 79 (showing that in an action for ejectment, a person was 
required to prove that he had an “absolute right,” which suggests that title was proven by displaying 
exclusive ownership). 
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supporting one’s claim to property.65  Crucially, once title was determined, 
it also dictated remedy,66 thereby lightening the entire decision-making 
burden.  Given the importance of administrative efficiency to the very 
concept of justice and the rule of law,67 these virtues of ownership cannot 
be overstated, nor can they be relegated to the past.  Problems of proof and 
efficient administration are entirely modern problems. 
Leaving proof to the side for now, however, it is worth pausing over 
what was lost in the transition to the newer forms of action.  The medieval 
experience with property-related writs does not suggest that allocating 
property on the basis of possession rather than ownership was either 
unnatural or wasteful of property resources.  Indeed, as experience with 
such writs as that of novel disseisin suggests, it appears to have been more 
natural to address the question of possession directly because it was the 
ultimate question that concerned the parties.68  It was the use of an 
important resource that mattered, not the question of what title to that 
resource symbolized.69  In the early days of the writ system, then, there 
was a very robust connection between property use and efficiency.  The 
legal system was structured in such a way as to monitor directly the ways 
in which property was used so as to ensure efficiency.  Critically, as courts 
of equity developed nuanced injunctions over the next several centuries, 
these remedies replaced the early writs as a means of maintaining that 
connection.70  Over time, as title became a proxy for more and more 
interests and, ultimately, outcomes, that close connection between legal 
rules (or writs) and productive property use became more attenuated.  
Eventually, more legal rules in property law were structured so owners 
could determine the best uses of the property.71  One influential view in 
modern property law is that the reframing of property rules in favor of 
owners’ determinations about uses was advantageous as a matter of 
                                                                                                                          
65 See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988) 
(explaining that property rules are “hard-edged” like crystals). 
66 See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 94 (explaining that forcible entry as a remedy became 
illegal unless ordered by a judge after title was determined). 
67 See, e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 3 (2002) 
(“A thin theory [of rule of law] stresses the formal or instrumental aspects . . . that any legal system 
allegedly must possess to function effectively as a system of laws.”). 
68 See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92 (explaining that plaintiffs sought to recover the 
seisin of land); SIMPSON, supra note 9, at 35–37 (explaining that in the writ of right, the parties were 
concerned with seisin of land and that seisin and actual possession are interchangeable concepts). 
69 See DONAHUE ET AL., supra note 35, at 92 (noting that plaintiffs sought to recover seisin of the 
land and not a right to ownership). 
70 See SINGER, supra note 29, at 101 (crediting the equity courts with inventing the doctrines of 
easement by estoppel and constructive trusts); Charles Donahue, Jr., What Happened in the English 
Legal System in the Fourteenth Century and Why Would Anyone Want to Know?, 63 SMU L. REV. 949, 
954, 957 (2010) (discussing the expansion of the writ of trespass and the development of the 
predecessor to the modern trust). 
71 Smith, supra note 10, at 1728. 
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administrative and economic efficiency.72 
But with that reframing, a second connection became more attenuated, 
and it is a connection that is hauntingly familiar in modern property law.  
In the medieval writ system, the direct manipulation of uses produced 
broad access to and use of land at a time when land oligarchy was quite 
obviously an exceptional burden.73  Although ultimate ownership could not 
be the subject of adjudication, use and possession could be, and by 
distributing such uses more broadly, property law was able to achieve 
much distributive justice.74  When rights were defined and consolidated in 
the form of proprietorship claims, and information costs reduced thereby,75 
property law surrendered its capacity to directly accomplish broad 
distribution of uses.  As Section II.D discusses, then and now, this new 
balance produced new externalities, some of them negative.76 
Finally, while proof of property claims became easier with the turn to 
absolute ownership, the possibility of shared property interests became 
much more remote.  Although it was largely implicit, the imperative to 
share property undergirded the entire medieval system, given the ultimate 
right of the crown.77  As freeholds transitioned to fee simple estates, the 
convergence of factors that produced a system of broad sharing was 
dismantled.  Much has been written of the efficiencies gained from 
enclosure of the commons.78  But, as even this brief discussion should 
remind us, sharing took many more forms than that of a commons.  What 
we lost in the actual and symbolic deconstruction of the commons was the 
latent opportunity to explore the full potential of property sharing in a 
                                                                                                                          
72 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.1, at 33 (4th ed. 1992) (asserting 
that an owner’s exclusive right to land is necessary for the land’s efficient use); see also Smith, supra 
note 10, at 1728 (“Property responds to uncertainty over uses by bundling uses together and delegating 
to the owner the choice of how to use the asset, thus avoiding the need to specify uses at any stage.”). 
73 See BODENHEIMER ET AL., supra note 48, at 42 (explaining that a lessee for years had broader 
access to land upon the development of new writs in the thirteenth century because he or she had a new 
right to recover possession). 
74 See id. (describing the development of writs which allowed lessees to recover possession of 
land).  Of course the modern concern over the question of muddying ownership is that it impedes 
alienability and efficiency.  But as Part III demonstrates, shared uses can be just as efficient as 
exclusive title.  See infra Part III.  Moreover, recent scholarship has provided us with excellent and 
numerous examples in which limiting alienability can be normatively desirable.  See, e.g., Lee Anne 
Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1451–57 (2009) (presenting circumstances in 
which restricting alienability “might work better than placing pressure on (or only on) property’s other 
margins—acquisition, use, and exclusion”). 
75 Smith, supra note 10, at 1728. 
76 See infra Part II.D (showing that proprietorship claims that focus on formal title do not address 
the legitimate interests of both parties).  
77 See BODENHEIMER ET AL., supra note 48, at 48–49 (discussing the ultimate power of the king to 
decide disputes over land). 
78 See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1074 (2005) 
(explaining how the enclosure movement was economically efficient). 
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system grounded in widely distributed fee simple ownership.79 
B.  Calabresi and Melamed: Built-In Assumptions in a Binary Framework 
In their engagement with remedies, the legal realists were the 
theoretical counterparts to the early writ system.  Therefore, this Section 
and the next explore the extent to which the realists’ exploration of legal 
outcomes recognized the value of sharing.  Given their influence on 
property law, this discussion begins with Calabresi and Melamed, 
concluding that their particular focus on outcomes did not capture the 
possibility of sharing.  Section II.C then turns to an alternative realist 
approach that has far greater potential to promote sharing. 
In writing their 1972 article on remedies in property law, Calabresi and 
Melamed elaborated on a core legal realist point made largely in 
discussions of contract law by Oliver Wendell Holmes and Karl 
Llewellyn.80  They argued that while entitlements are clearly the first order 
decisions to be made in a given property dispute, the choice of remedies 
fundamentally shapes the very nature of the entitlement.81  Calabresi and 
Melamed’s contribution to property theory cannot be overstated.  The 
introduction of a legal realist perspective into discussions about the 
distributional effects of remedies in property disputes has influenced the 
development of doctrines at the heart of property law, including nuisance,82 
takings,83 concurrent ownership,84 and servitudes.85  Their contribution is 
                                                                                                                          
79 We also thereby lost the opportunity to develop legal mechanisms that might help to solve 
alienability problems in the presence of shared rights.  The Restatement (Third) provides excellent 
examples of the possibilities here.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 7.10 cmts. a–c 
(2000) (allowing for modification, rather than termination, as a means of preserving servitudes in the 
face of new circumstances). 
80 See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 10–11 (1962) (exploring the importance of remedies in contract law); 
K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 83 (1951) (underscoring the notion that in either contract or 
property law, an individual has a “primary right” for performance of the contract or exclusive control of 
the land and the “secondary right” of the individual is in the form of damages); see also infra Part II.C 
(discussing Holmes and his emphasis on determination of remedy before a determination of 
entitlement). 
81 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1090–91 (discussing how the law first establishes 
a right to entitlement, but this entitlement is shaped by the state’s choice to intervene and enforce that 
right in the form of a remedy). 
82 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1,       
38–39, 77 (2002) (applying the concept of “pliability rules” to nuisance cases); James E. Krier & 
Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 440, 470–71 (1995) (discussing remedies in a nuisance dispute). 
83 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 59–60 (discussing a property owner’s rights 
when the government exercises its power of eminent domain and the owner is left only with “the right 
of ‘just compensation’” as a remedy); id. at 75–77 (applying a pliability rule analysis to an exercise of 
eminent domain, in which property is taken and then transferred to a private party). 
84 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 27, at 1096–97 (discussing concurrent ownership). 
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noteworthy, in part, because it has inspired such substantial thinking about 
remedies on the basis of what amounts to a set of rich descriptive 
observations. 
As many scholars have noted, however, Calabresi and Melamed’s 
particular view of the cathedral is also limiting.86  Although much has been 
written about how Calabresi and Melamed have shaped remedies analyses 
in property law, the literature (somewhat surprisingly) does not examine 
the extent to which Calabresi and Melamed’s particular view of the 
cathedral has affected the development of approaches in property law that 
privilege outcome over title.  In truth, the authors’ interpretation of what it 
means to focus on outcomes in resolving disputes is just one interpretation, 
and as descriptive as their framework appears to be, it superimposes a quite 
significant layer of meaning about what remedies do and how they can be 
categorized.  While the assumptions embedded in the authors’ framework 
are significant in their own right, the dominant interpretations of the 
authors’ framework that exist in property law scholarship are even more 
powerful constraints on the development of an outcome-focused mode of 
dispute resolution that incorporates sharing. 
Three of the authors’ own assumptions are of particular importance 
here.  First, Calabresi and Melamed’s framework is binary in the sense that 
the authors described two levels of decisionmaking for a given dispute.87  
The first level of decisionmaking is to determine who has an entitlement.88  
It is only once an entitlement is set that the second level of 
decisionmaking, that of determining the appropriate outcome, occurs.89  
The remedy, as Calabresi and Melamed described it, is a second order 
choice, an important one with distributional consequences, but nonetheless 
a switch that is turned on upon the setting of the entitlement.90  Moreover, 
the choice of remedy is a one-time decision, which is not revisited over 
time or as circumstances between the parties change.91 
Of course, the ordering of these two decisions is a substantial nod to 
the title-dominating view of property.92  By designating entitlement as the 
                                                                                                                          
85 See Lovett, supra note 27, at 77 (promoting the view of servitudes “not as inflexible property 
rights, but as evolving relationships between parties with concurrent interests in the same land”). 
86 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 15–25 (reviewing scholarship presenting 
normative and descriptive challenges to claims made by Calabresi and Melamed). 
87 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1090–91. 
88 Id. at 1090. 
89 Id.  Of course, such a remedy could be no liability. 
90 Id. at 1090–91.  
91 This is one of the shortcomings that Bell and Parchomovsky seek to address with the 
introduction of their “pliability rules.”  Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 38–39.  
92 As will be discussed, it is also a meaningful divergence from Holmes, who argued that a 
decision maker ought to begin by defining a set of facts that delimit a remedial need.  See HOLMES, 
supra note 32, at 215 (“There are always two things to be asked: first, what are the facts which make up 
the group in question; and then, what are the consequences attached by the law to that group.”). 
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switch that turns on remedies, Calabresi and Melamed effectively 
concluded that an outcome cannot be set unless and until an entitlement is 
defined or redefined.93  Outcomes, in other words, cannot exist in the 
absence of pre-defined entitlements, even though it is also the case that 
outcomes have the effect of activating a redefinition of entitlements in light 
of the chosen outcome.  In these respects, entitlements act as on/off 
switches for triggering remedies. 
Indeed, several of the most influential critiques of Calabresi and 
Melamed’s original framework suggest modifications that effectively 
create “glider switches” allowing for adjustments in compensation over 
time,94 or transitions from injunctions to damages or vice versa.95  These 
modifications allow the framework to fit more comfortably in contexts 
where access to and ownership of land is contested.  In such contexts, the 
creation or enforcement of an easement over the course of time, for 
example, can act as a glider switch that effectively transfers ownership 
while softening the effects of such a transfer by temporal means.96  
Similarly, the allowance of a certain “activity level,” for example, dumping 
up to a certain level of pollution but not beyond it, can provide for partial 
or gradual transfer of ownership.97 
Though it is not their apparent intent, such glider switches also 
accomplish sharing, though typically only along temporal lines or by 
softening the harsh effects of a blunt injunction by an award of damages.  
These limited leanings toward sharing reflect a reality that may well differ 
from that which Calabresi and Melamed purported to describe.  The 
original cathedral was glimpsed at a moment when the surrounding 
conversation centered on the ramifications of Coase’s insights about the 
importance of individual ownership and wealth maximization and their 
relationship to exclusion.98  In this context, protecting entitlements with 
property rules meant rewarding injunctive relief to one individual.  As 
diverse views of the cathedral are cataloged, it has become clearer that 
such a limited use of injunctions is unduly constraining and harsh. 
Calabresi and Melamed’s framework is also binary in another 
significant respect, and this is the second assumption underlying the 
                                                                                                                          
93 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092−93. 
94 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 27, at 1080−82 (providing an example of temporal division of 
property and its effect on bargaining). 
95 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 38–39. 
96 See id. at 67−68 (describing the versatility of pliability rules in determining the most efficient 
and just outcomes).   
97 Ayres & Talley, supra note 27, at 1078−80. 
98 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 8−11 (recognizing Coase’s intellectual 
contribution to the discussion of transaction costs as a catalyst “for all subsequent law and economics 
scholars,” but acknowledging that Coase’s article fell short by not discussing “how entitlements should 
be protected after the initial allocation”). 
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framework.  The binarism here is in the categorization of remedies: After 
determining who is owed an entitlement, Calabresi and Melamed claimed 
that a decision maker can choose to protect that entitlement with either a 
property rule or a liability rule.99  Property rules enforce the court’s 
decision about who receives an entitlement by requiring one who wishes to 
take the entitlement to buy it from the holder by means of a voluntary 
transaction.100  Liability rules allow others to remove the entitlement from 
its holder by paying a predetermined price.101  Calabresi and Melamed also 
introduced a third type of remedial rule, inalienability rules, which 
preclude the holder from selling the entitlement.102  However, this Article 
adopts the prevailing perspective that the theoretical force of Calabresi and 
Melamed’s framework is in its binary division between property and 
liability rules.103 
Despite being binary in this respect, the authors’ original framework 
was indisputably capacious, allowing the authors to categorize virtually all 
remedies as either property rules, liability rules, or some hybrid of the 
two.104  The binarism of the framework was not limiting in the sense that 
certain remedies were left out and at risk of underuse as a result.  But, of 
course, categorization adds meaning, and in this case the authors called a 
property rule a “collective decision as to who is to be given an initial 
entitlement but not as to the value of the entitlement.”105  How then would 
they categorize an injunction requiring a certain amount of sharing?  Such 
an outcome would presumably fit within the category of liability rules, but 
not comfortably so, given the authors’ equation of liability rules with 
damages.106  Without such a categorization it seems entirely possible that 
injunctive relief could easily have involved more nuanced grants of rights 
of access, use, and even exclusion, allowing for the separation of property 
interests that are currently bundled. 
Obviously the first, but probably also the second of these two 
                                                                                                                          
99 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1092−93.  Recent scholarship has clarified that inalienability rules play an important role 
in property law.  See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 74, at 1406 (exploring the potential of inalienability 
rules to help achieve efficiency).  
103 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 4−5 (“[T]he analytical structure devised by 
Calabresi and Melamed, and in particular, the foundational distinction between property and liability 
rules, has been accepted by virtually all the commentators.”); Smith, supra note 10, at 1720 n.1 
(explaining that while Calabresi & Melamed also discussed inalienability rules, the article would focus 
on their framework concerning property and liability rules). 
104 And the authors characterized the few that were neither property rules or liability rules as 
inalienability rules.  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1092−93. 
105 Id. at 1092. 
106 See id. at 1116 (describing the calculation of damages as difficult for courts to determine, 
because often the injuries suffered are not easily measurable). 
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assumptions, appears to be holdovers from a title-focused perspective.  
Even as Calabresi and Melamed were describing the powerful 
redefinitional effect of remedial choices, they were affirming that the 
choice of remedies still must follow a determination of which party has the 
entitlement.  In these respects, their own assumptions narrowed the space 
in which an outcome-focused approach could develop.  The third 
assumption underlying the authors’ framework is likely more attributable 
to the authors’ apparent interest in tracking the economic consequences of 
their framework rather than in tracking the development of the common 
law. 
The third assumption is the authors’ claim that, among the different 
reasons for choosing entitlements, the primary reasons are economic 
efficiency or distributional preferences.107  Here again, the authors’ 
categorization, though descriptive and capacious, is also quite 
normative.108  As to this aspect of their framework, the authors have 
received attention for failing to consider adequately the pluralistic values 
that motivate individuals to seek outcomes or protect rights.109  While 
Calabresi and Melamed focused on the distribution of wealth and “merit 
good[s],”110 recent scholarship has elaborated substantially on other 
important goals.  For example, the broader notions of individual and 
community economic development provide a palette of values underlying 
the notion of fair distribution.  These include concepts of human 
capabilities and democratic ideals, among other important features.111  
                                                                                                                          
107 Id. at 1102.  The authors mention a third category, “other justice reasons,” but “admit that it is 
hard to know what content can be poured into that term, at least given the very broad definitions of 
economic efficiency and distributional goals.”  Id. 
108 As with other aspects of their framework, the authors’ purportedly equal treatment of 
efficiency and distributional issues has been overshadowed over time by a focus on the efficiency 
considerations inherent in their framework.  See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 82, at 25 
(“Calabresi and Melamed’s call to consider distributive and other justice considerations in determining 
the allocation of entitlements has been all but ignored by subsequent law and economics scholars.  
Although Calabresi and Melamed put the various considerations on equal footing, economic efficiency 
somehow eclipsed the two other values.”). 
109 See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three’s a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and 
Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 469 (1999) (“[Calabresi and 
Melamed’s concept] does not describe any remedial regime that does or could exist under any legal 
system . . . in which there are more than two parties.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and 
Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (1998) (discussing shortcomings of the 
Calabresi and Melamed model). 
110 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1098−101. 
111 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 70−86 (2000) (arguing that human capabilities should help determine political ideals and 
formulate the rights guaranteed to every citizen); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 
1−7 (1985) (describing how a person’s well-being is directly related to the fundamental concern of 
economics, and one’s capabilities help assess this well-being); Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. 
Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 127, 134−38 (2009) (discussing 
certain human capabilities, including life, freedom, practical reason, and affiliation); Joseph William 
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Additional goals include cultural values and community norms about long-
term land use, both of which inform our collective sense of fairness in 
property relationships. 
This Article adds modestly to these critiques by noting that the 
primacy of economic efficiency in the authors’ model presumptively drives 
the choice of remedies toward efficiency-focused entitlements.  If reasons 
for preferring entitlements were recognized as being more various and 
pluralistic in nature, we might well expect that choices of outcomes would 
reflect that variety.  Thus, we might see less coalescence of property 
bundles than we see where the most efficient outcome is presumed to be 
the best outcome and, as the next Section discusses, where exclusive 
ownership is presumed to be most efficient. 
Consider the example of shared uses.  Such uses are not just a matter 
of most effectively internalizing the externalities of property ownership 
and use; they also can increase the “size of the pie,” providing more 
individuals with access to property for the purpose of productive use.  A 
failure to provide such access detracts from this goal.  Moreover, the 
exclusive nature of use in the ownership-dominated remedial framework 
limits the extent to which cultural values associated with group-based 
norms can be realized.  The same could be said for long-term planning.  In 
short, the notion of use exclusivity renders social and cultural context 
largely irrelevant, or at least only affirms dominant (rather than pluralistic) 
values in this regard. 
While Calabresi and Melamed’s particular view of the cathedral has 
shaped an outcome-focused approach in meaningful ways, the more 
significant effect of their framework is the extraordinary influence it has 
had on property scholarship in that regard.  In short, property scholars have 
interpreted the binarisms within the framework, combined with the 
emphasis on economic efficiency, to mean that entitlements that rise to the 
level of ownership should be remedied with broad property rules.  By this 
interpretation, the limitations on ownership are enforced with narrow 
exceptions to these rules.  This is quite a significant extension of the 
original framework, which claimed that property rules work best where 
there are low transactions costs, while liability rules are more effective in 
the presence of high transactions costs.112  The overlay that some scholars 
add to Calabresi and Melamed’s original interpretation is that low 
                                                                                                                          
Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1009, 1045−46 (2009) (sympathizing with the approach to property that focuses on identifying 
capabilities in the context of determining property rights). 
112 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1106–10.  In exploring the connection between 
entitlement and outcome, Calabresi and Melamed employed what appeared to be an elastic notion of an 
entitlement that could easily accommodate rights to property that are less absolute than the full bundle 
of rights idealized by Blackstone.  For example, an entitlement could simply be to “make noise.”  Id. at 
1090. 
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transaction costs exist where an exclusive notion of ownership can be 
discerned in the name of one of the parties.  It is thus only where exclusive 
ownership is difficult to discern that liability rules or narrow exceptions to 
broad property rules are more appropriate. 
These extensions of Calabresi and Melamed’s original framework are 
nowhere more evident than in Professor Henry Smith’s defense of property 
rules.113  In his article, he undertakes to develop a theory of property rules 
that “allow[s] an explanation of why property rules tend to be associated 
with entitlements that we label ‘property,’”114 and concludes that such rules 
often are paired with rights of exclusion,115 the “sine qua non” of property 
ownership.116  As he states: 
Property responds to uncertainty over uses by bundling uses 
together and delegating to the owner the choice of how to use 
the asset, thus avoiding the need to specify uses at any 
stage. . . . On the duty holder side, the message is a simple 
one—to “keep out.”117 
Smith’s point is straightforward.  Without the broad injunction (or property 
rule) to “keep out,” the information costs associated with the exploitation 
of resources would be too high.118  It would be unnecessarily costly for 
those other than the owners themselves to identify appropriate uses of a 
given resource and then to allocate those uses among different owners and 
non-owners.119  Professor Smith reinforces this analysis by detailing the 
connection between property rules and the in rem understanding of 
property rights.120 
By contrast, as Smith describes here and elsewhere, there are 
categories of property disputes in which decision makers cannot avoid 
more directly regulating “use conflict[s],”121 and it is largely on these 
disputes that this Article concentrates.  Smith describes such disputes as 
falling within what he terms “governance regimes.”122  In these cases, 
decision makers must “pick out more specific activities for 
                                                                                                                          
113 See generally Smith, supra note 10 (arguing that property rules have advantages over liability 
rules). 
114 Id. at 1723. 
115 Id. at 1724; see also id. at 1754–74 (describing in great detail the necessary interrelatedness of 
property rules and the right to exclude). 
116 Merrill, supra note 10, at 730. 
117 Smith, supra note 10, at 1728. 
118 See id. at 1724–30 (“Property rules benefit from the savings in information costs that are made 
possible by rights to exclude as opposed to more tailored use rights.”). 
119 Id. at 1754–55, 1763–64. 
120 Id. at 1724. 
121 Id. at 1756.  
122 Id. at 1751−53, 1757.    
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measurement.”123  Such governance regimes have long existed, often 
having been used with respect to common resources, but they are also 
evident in other core areas of the common law.124  In contrast to 
“exclusion” regimes, where rights of use are bundled together under the 
owner’s control without being individually delineated and regulated, 
governance regimes directly manage specified uses.125 
Professor Smith’s arguments about property rules fall within a broader 
scholarly conversation that has emerged, arguing that the most accurate 
legal description of property law is that it is about the right to exclude.126  
Although this conversation may not always reference Calabresi and 
Melamed’s cathedral framework, it does much to contribute to the equation 
of entitlement with exclusive ownership in property law.  In this view, 
property rights ought to remain bundled wherever the potential for 
reducing information costs exists.127   
One of several problems with this perspective is that it preconceives a 
conclusion that begins the analysis of any given property dispute by 
considering the “right” of an owner to the “thing” owned.128  Such a 
beginning point encourages decision makers to search for the “thing” and 
then to label it as being absolutely owned by one of the parties.  Professor 
Merrill, Professor Smith, and other “exclusion scholars” who support this 
view describe it as a more accurate description of how property law 
operates in the real world.  Parts III and IV of this Article dispute this 
claim, at least in certain core areas of property law, one of which (trespass) 
the exclusion scholars claim as falling within their regime.  For now, it is 
necessary to say only that the exclusion literature contributes further to a 
particular interpretation of the cathedral framework in which entitlements 
are bundled and broadly protected, leaving very little conceptual room for 
sharing. 
                                                                                                                          
123 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S455 (2002).  See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Governance 
Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853 (2012) (drawing a distinction between exclusion property and 
governance property and recognizing the importance of internal relationships among property owners). 
124 Smith, supra note 123, at S455. 
125 Smith, supra note 10, at 1755−56. 
126 See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 10, at 72 (“The exclusion thesis is a statement of the driving 
analysis of property in legal systems.  It characterizes property primarily as a protected sphere of 
indefinite and undefined activity, in which an owner may do anything with the things he owns.”); 
Merrill, supra note 10, at 730 (“Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued 
resource, . . . and you give them property.  Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have 
property.”); see also Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 
275, 275–77 (2008) (proposing that ownership is most concerned with the owner’s position as the 
exclusive controller of her property). 
127 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 31−34 (2000) (arguing that standardization of property rights will lower the 
“external costs of measurement to third parties” such as information costs). 
128 Smith, supra note 11, at 1691.  
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The exclusion scholars are not the only ones who have contributed to 
the conflation in property law of entitlement with ownership and property 
rules with “keep out” orders.  Professors Kaplow and Shavell arrive at a 
similar, though more limited, extension of Calabresi and Malamed’s 
original framework by concluding that property rules are appropriate to 
remedy what they label “possessory interests,” which they equate with the 
low transaction cost scenarios in which the original framework would tend 
toward property rules.129  More limited examples such as this are still 
important to include here because of the assumptions embedded in the 
labels used.  What exactly are possessory disputes?  The answer may well 
depend on whether a decision maker begins by defining rights or begins by 
considering remedies.  In sum, while the literature on Calabresi and 
Melamed develops sophisticated interpretations and extensions of the 
framework, a more basic theme that emerges is the drift from a broader 
notion of entitlement that can be remedied by property or liability rules 
depending on transaction costs to a narrower notion of bundled ownership 
to be remedied by property rules. 
Although it is by no means preordained, the prevailing understanding 
of the bundle-of-rights view of property in some respects amplifies the 
association between entitlement and ownership.  The modern legal view is 
that the use of land is something that can be independently owned; one can 
be independently entitled to use land.130  Because use has become capable 
of independent ownership and transfer, it has taken on the attributes of 
ownership.  Of particular interest here, the “right to use,” as in the case of 
an easement, has assumed a mantle of exclusivity.  It is a right that only the 
owner may define, unless of course such a right is overridden by a new 
prescriptive right or by condemnation.131  Thus, the owner of a “right to 
use” has the right to determine who may use and, often, how much and for 
how long.  This is not to say that the bundle view of property is not also 
                                                                                                                          
129 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 27, at 716. 
130 See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 1597, 1606−09 (2008) (providing a brief overview of the forms of property contemplated by 
American property law); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An 
Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 688 (2008) (highlighting the independence of the 
right to use from title to land by discussing the rent-seeking opportunities opened up to tenants, 
servitude, holder, and others via exercise of the right not to use); see also Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, 
Compensation for Injuries to Land Caused by Planning Authorities: Towards a Comprehensive 
Theory, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 47, 122 (1996) (discussing the bundle-of-rights conception of property 
and arguing that the law currently views restrictions on the right to use (among other sticks in the 
bundle) as prima facie injuries to an independent property right). 
131 See Larissa Katz, A Powers-Based Approach to the Protection of Ideas, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 687, 720−23 (2006) (pointing out that the exclusivity of the right to use also encompasses a 
right to share); Katz, supra note 126, at 309 (stating that “[l]imits in property law on what qualifies as 
an easement amount to exclusivity rules that preserve the supremacy of the owner’s position” to 
determine the uses of the easement within its bounds). 
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quite useful in considering the pragmatic possibility of an outcome-focused 
approach.  It is, however, to say that the bundle view has itself become 
infused with basic assumptions about ownership that are not necessary to a 
robust version of that view nor, more broadly, to sensible dispute 
resolution. 
C.  Holmes:  Outcome Before Ownership 
The purpose of this Section is to present a theoretical conception of an 
outcome-focused approach that is not saddled with the assumptions 
embedded in Calabresi and Melamed’s framework (and its extended 
versions as developed by other scholars).  Most importantly, given my 
claim that the binarisms in the framework limit the real world possibilities 
for diverse outcomes, the objective here is to present a framework that 
actually begins by considering outcomes before rights and that does not 
presumptively categorize injunctions as broadly defined “property rules.”  
Though rudimentary, the framework proposed by Holmes in his review of 
the common law avoids both of these binarisms and thus, I argue, serves as 
a more promising foundation for an efficacious outcome-focused approach 
in modern property law that creates space for sharing.  By not implicitly 
favoring efficiency goals, Holmes’s framework also avoids the third 
assumption that inheres in the cathedral framework.  This Section 
describes Holmes’s framework and its latent potential for property law.  
Section II.D and Part III develop Holmes’s framework for modern 
application. 
Given his realist orientation, Holmes’s effort was to replace the 
abstract morality that had infused the common law with an inquiry into 
how individuals actually respond to legal rules.132  In The Path of the Law, 
for example, Holmes attacked the notion that legal “rights” and “duties” 
exist in any abstract, moral, or independent sense by making three basic 
observations about them in operation.  First, Holmes argued that legal 
rights and duties are nothing but predictions “that if a man does or omits 
certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of 
the court.”133  Second, he claimed that it is in this respect that legal rights 
are different from moral rights, the latter of which may have meaning 
independent of the extent to which they are enforced and the means of 
enforcing them.134  Third, Holmes argued that it typically does not matter if 
                                                                                                                          
132 See Holmes, supra note 30, at 168–69 (claiming a confusion between law and morality and 
proposing the idea that legal rights and duties are merely a system of predictions). 
133 Id. at 169.  Holmes put it even more strongly in his discussion of the common law of 
possession: “A legal right is nothing but a permission to exercise certain natural powers, and upon 
certain conditions to obtain protection, restitution, or compensation by the aid of the public force.”  
HOLMES, supra note 32, at 214. 
134 Holmes, supra note 30, at 170–71. 
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a legal duty is described in terms of “praise” or “blame” if the consequence 
is the same.135  In this basic sense, the precise definition of the duty, for 
example as a “fine[]” or a “tax[],”136 does not matter.  Holmes concluded: 
“You see how the vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks and at 
the same time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and 
expel everything except the object of our study, the operations of the 
law.”137 
In these observations, Holmes recognized that a more expansive 
understanding of duties might exist in the case where courts grant 
injunctions and enforce them by putting the defendant in prison or 
“otherwise punishing him unless he complies with the order of the 
court.”138  He emphasized that these circumstances ought to be the 
exception from a general theory of the relationship between rights and 
remedies rather than the rule.139 
Nevertheless, given this Article’s focus on property law, the vagueness 
of Holmes’s claims about injunctions is confusing until one observes the 
same basic argument in his discussion of possession and ownership in 
property law.140  In that discussion, Holmes emphasized that there was no 
legal distinction between de facto possession and the legal right to 
possess.141  More profoundly, he argued that the facts constituting 
possession and those constituting ownership generate essentially the same 
set of legal rights, though the latter are slightly more extensive than the 
former.142  This was so because the remedies available to both the “mere” 
possessor and the owner were largely the same.143  These observations are 
a perhaps startling echo of the basic reality in the early system of writs for 
real actions.144  What makes the comparison startling is that Holmes was 
observing a reality in a system that purported to be so very engrossed with 
the question of rights and duties. 
As Holmes recognized, the assumed primacy of rights in legal thinking 
made it difficult even to conceive of a world in which remedies could be 
assigned without first resolving the question of whether one or another 
                                                                                                                          
135 Id. at 174. 
136 Id. at 173. 
137 Id. at 174.   
138 Id. at 175–76. 
139 Id. at 176. 
140 See HOLMES, supra note 32, at 206–46 (analyzing possession as understood by the common 
law and its relationship to ownership and title). 
141 Id. at 238–39. 
142 Id. at 239, 246.  Holmes made the same point about the legal equivalence of different kinds of 
contract, given the reality that enforcement could never include compelling performance to any extent 
that could amount to servitude.  Id. at 300. 
143 See id. at 245–46 (enumerating the remedies available to both the owner and the possessor). 
144 See supra Part II.A (discussing the predominant focus on outcomes in resolving legal disputes 
in the early common law). 
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party is entitled to a remedy.145  The very dictates of logic seemed to 
require that a remedy could only be available to one who is entitled to it.146  
Thus the first hurdle to overcome in assessing the feasibility of an 
outcome-first norm was a conceptual one: it required a replicable and 
freestanding account of when a situation warrants a remedy.  Here again, 
Holmes provided the building blocks to overcome this hurdle. 
On the basis of his observations about the primacy of remedy, Holmes 
developed a prescription for the astute jurist—one who recognized that 
legal rights exist and are defined only by and to the extent of their 
enforcement.147  In essence, his prescription amounted to two questions 
that he argued must always be asked about a dispute: “[F]irst, what are the 
facts which make up the group in question; and then, what are the 
consequences attached by the law to that group.”148  With respect to the 
first question, Holmes emphasized the definition of a particular group by a 
set of characteristics that warranted legal action.  In his property example, 
that of possession, these characteristics included “a certain physical 
relation to [an] object and to the rest of the world” and “a certain intent.”149 
Notably, these are not characteristics that necessarily define title, as 
Holmes made clear when spinning out such scenarios as when a small 
child and a ruthless robber share the same intent vis-à-vis a found object.150  
Nevertheless, they are all that is required prior to answering the second 
question, namely what remedies are available to the particular group 
defined by these characteristics.151  It is, Holmes suggested, superfluous to 
consider what right, if any, that group shares,152 though as a practical 
matter it is probably more accurate to say that in Holmes’s world, the 
outcome would define the right rather than render it irrelevant.  The 
allocation of remedy is based on a replicable set of facts which, when 
present, should always warrant the same remedy.  Holmes was able to 
reduce the inquiry to just these two questions because of his equation of 
“right” with “consequence.”153  Once a jurist recognized the basic 
                                                                                                                          
145 See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 30, at 174–75 (discussing the “mystic significance” that contract 
law invests in “rights and duties”).  Of course, many scholars have argued that it is only right to analyze 
entitlements first.  See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 
YALE L.J. 1335, 1347 (1986) (“Conflating this distinction between right and remedy is commonplace 
within the realist tradition that so dominates American Jurisprudence.”). 
146 But see Holmes, supra note 30, at 184, 198 (emphasizing that normative considerations, what 
he describes as questions of “social advantage,” ought to guide legal decisions rather than an abstract 
sense of logic). 
147 HOLMES, supra note 32, at 214–15; Holmes, supra note 30, at 184. 
148 HOLMES, supra note 32, at 215. 
149 Id. at 216. 
150 Id. at 235. 
151 Id. at 215. 
152 Id. at 214–15. 
153 Id. at 214. 
 2013] SHARING THE CATHEDRAL 675 
irrelevance of rights independent of the remedy (or consequence) that 
protected them, he or she was justified in avoiding an examination of the 
“rights” of the parties as a separate inquiry (or, if you will, a third 
question).154  This, of course, is in sharp contrast with the binary in the 
cathedral framework in which a determination of the entitlement is still the 
“first issue.”155  Here, Holmes dispensed with the question entirely, a move 
which the model adapting his framework in Part III does not go so far as to 
make.  Also absent from the basic property examples that Holmes explored 
is a predisposition toward broadly enjoining others from interfering with 
property rights.  The outcome would depend on the surrounding 
circumstances, whether involving age, infirmity, theft, temporary needs of 
access or use, or myriad other criteria. 
In short, what makes Holmes’s framework so refreshing is the 
opportunity it presents to avoid designating “rights,” “owners,” and 
“things” that fall within the value-laden category of “title” or “ownership” 
before determining what about a given resource each party wants and 
could have.  At the level of theory, this would avoid a preoccupation with 
what “progressive property” scholars sometimes refer to as the ownership 
model of property and what exclusion scholars refer to as gate-keeping.  
As Section II.D discusses, such a reorientation acknowledges that while 
information costs might be reduced in an exclusion model of property law, 
exclusion from packaged rights produces negative externalities and 
transaction costs that a focus on outcomes could avoid.  The key example 
supporting this observation is that of sharing.  In a world in which access 
to resources is increasingly constricted to fewer owners, an exclusion 
perspective on trespass law leaves many non-owners dependent on more 
limited public resources when the alternative could have left non-owners 
with limited opportunities to share private property. 
And this possibility of property sharing, along with a greater openness 
to diverse outcomes among owners and non-owners, is precisely the 
greatest pragmatic potential of adapting Holmes’s framework.  As Part III 
will show, Holmes’s framework presents a means to produce actual 
benefits from what property judges intuitively are drawn to do.  It is a 
means of acting upon judges’ intuitions where those intuitions reflect deep 
experience with the needs of parties vis-à-vis limited resources.  In this 
respect, it is a theory that closely fits the reality of modern property 
jurisprudence.  As the case analyses below demonstrate, what was lost in 
the progression from outcomes to entitlements and ultimately to bundled 
ownership was the (perhaps largely inchoate) possibility of sharing in 
                                                                                                                          
154 See id. (“Every right is a consequence attached by the law to one or more facts which the law 
defines, and whenever the law gives any one special rights not shared by the body of the people, it does 
so on the ground that certain special facts, not true of the rest of the world, are true of him.”). 
155 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1090. 
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ancient property law. 
D.  The Interest-Outcome Approach 
The progression in the conceptualization of property interests from 
writs to realists provides the foundation for a rich alternative to thinking 
about property as a tightly bundled set of rights that justifies blunt 
exclusion.  This approach, which I label here as the interest-outcome 
approach, captures important features of the different approaches 
developed in each of these periods.  From the medieval writ system, the 
key feature that contributes to the interest-outcome approach is the notion 
that possession and use are more salient interests to protect than a formal 
designation of title.  The medieval system embodied a second dichotomy, 
that of outcome versus right or title.  By rewarding possession, the system 
implicitly prioritized outcome over formal title.  The legal realists, from 
Holmes and Llewelyn to Calabresi, seized upon this second dichotomy as a 
way of understanding the scope, value, and extent of rights.  Holmes 
stretched it so far as to present a basic jurisprudential preference for 
remedy over right, where the imperative to remedy could be ascertained by 
determining need rather than right.156  Property theorists who have 
explored the cathedral more recently have labeled the dichotomy 
somewhat differently, adding their own layers of meaning to it.  Thus, 
Smith has emphasized that the choice is really between governance 
regimes focusing on use on the one hand and title-centered regimes 
focusing on exclusion on the other.157 
As Part III will discuss in detail, the different dichotomies represented 
in these approaches are supplemented by the business of judging, a 
business that was iconically captured by Carol Rose’s description of the 
judicial muddying of crystalline rules.158  This classic process of layering 
exceptions to prevent unfairness began in the Fourteenth Century by, for 
example, the addition of injunctive relief as a remedy for a person bringing 
a claim of disseisin.159  As Professor Singer has described, the basic 
dichotomy between equity and law continues to animate decisions in 
property cases.160  We also see a version of this dichotomy in judicially 
created exceptions based on the particular facts of a case despite the 
                                                                                                                          
156 See supra Part II.C (presenting Holmes’s theoretical framework, which considers the outcomes 
of property disputes before rights and emphasizing Holmes’s focus on remedies). 
157 Smith, supra note 123, at S453, S455. 
158 Rose, supra note 65, at 578–80.   
159 See Donahue, supra note 70, at 954–57 (recounting the establishment of courts of equity 
during the fourteenth century). 
160 See SINGER, supra note 29, at 98–105 (presenting the interplay between law and equity and the 
importance of both in cases involving property). 
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apparent applicability of one or more clear rules.161  We see another 
version in judicial and scholarly claims that the morality of a given 
situation dictates a certain result in support of,162 or even in the face of,163 
clear-cut rules. 
The interest-outcome approach is a means of resolving property 
disputes where more than one legitimate interest exists concerning use, 
possession, or access to a piece of property and where such interests are 
represented in the form of conflicting positions concerning the property.  In 
such a situation, Professor Smith’s recommendation of an exclusion regime 
with bundled title would not be of much use in recognizing and resolving 
legitimate interests on both sides of a dispute.  Someone would have to 
lose in Smith’s world, and unnecessarily so.164  Instead, the interest-
outcome approach would begin the process of dispute resolution by having 
the court recognize and define the legitimate interests on both sides of a 
dispute.  This would decidedly not be a process of searching out who has 
formal title.  Rather, the task would be to determine each party’s interests 
vis-à-vis the property.  The heart of the interest-outcome approach would 
be the second step, which would require the court to consider outcomes 
that could best accommodate each party’s legitimate interests.  It would 
only be at the third and final step that formal title, and entitlements more 
broadly defined, would come back into the picture, requiring the court to 
consider the extent to which they are relevant to a given dispute. 
While resonating with each of the dichotomies described above, the 
interest-outcome approach draws its main inspiration from negotiation 
theory, which—at its core—protects interests over positions.  As Professor 
Robert Mnookin and his coauthors argued in Beyond Winning, by 
concentrating on interests, the parties in a given conflict can negotiate to 
create value in a given dispute.165  The present Article applies that core 
insight to property law by arguing that in many disputes, formal title is the 
equivalent to the starting positions that parties take in a dispute, which if 
pursued doggedly would result in one party winning everything and the 
                                                                                                                          
161 Id. 
162 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 10, at 1850 (arguing that property rights cannot exist unless a 
moral significance is attached to property ownership). 
163 See, e.g., Kevin Gray, Equitable Property, 47 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 157, 207 (1994) 
(identifying that a new type of equitable property will develop in order to supplement rules of law); 
Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 863–64 (2009) (asserting that a more 
normative theory of property would allow purely economic analysis to be situated within a moral 
framework). 
164 In this respect, the interest-outcome model resonates with the “split-the-difference” outcomes 
favored by Professors Parchomovsky, Siegelman, and Thel, in their discussion of windfalls, see Gideon 
Parchomovsky et al., Of Equal Rights and Half Wrongs, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 757–62 (2007), but 
this Article advocates for such outcomes in a much broader range of disputes. 
165 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS 
AND DISPUTES 35–37 (2000). 
 678 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:647 
other losing.166  By contrast, if the court and parties focus on the parties’ 
legitimate interests, they can more easily innovate outcomes that protect a 
broader range of those legitimate interests.167 
The negotiation-grounded focus of the interest-outcome approach thus 
emphasizes outcome far more than title.  As in the many examples 
provided by Mnookin and his coauthors, when the dispute resolution 
process begins by focusing on the interests “at the table,” the main focus of 
the process is in fact on the outcomes—or “trades”—that could be used to 
protect those interests.168  This approach also recognizes the importance of 
use and possession over and, at times, in lieu of formal title, because use 
and possession are often legitimate interests that can serve as the basis for 
finding more equitable outcomes or trades.  Similarly, a focus on interests 
picks up on Holmes and other legal realists’ attention to the parties’ needs 
rather than simply to their rights.169 
Comparing this approach to more contemporary views of the cathedral, 
this Article endorses and provides further support for Gregory Alexander’s 
and Joseph Singer’s arguments that many more property disputes are about 
governance than Professor Smith might believe.170  Thus, certainly in the 
contexts where the interest-outcome approach would most naturally apply 
(but quite possibly in the vast majority of property disputes), use must be 
evaluated for the purpose of determining who has been harmed, how much, 
and in what respect.  Indeed, in his analysis of the circumstances in which, 
counter-intuitively, the delineation of uses can be the lowest-cost method 
for resolving disputes, Professor Smith also presents a response to those 
who would argue that this model is too costly to take seriously.  Where this 
is the case, the evaluation of use for remedial purposes likely adds no cost 
at all.171  In addition to disagreement concerning the ubiquity of 
governance regimes, this Article also disputes Professor Smith’s views on 
remedies.  Smith proposes that remedies in “governance” disputes should 
center on liability rules.172  By contrast, this Article argues that the 
outcome-centered analysis required by the interest-outcome approach 
should normatively lead to a broad array of outcomes, involving both 
damages and injunctions. 
The vision of property disputes presented in this Article also adds a 
                                                                                                                          
166 Id. at 24, 125–26. 
167 Id. at 35–37.  
168 See, e.g., id. at 227 box 17 (comparing the net-expected-outcome approach to the interest-
based approach to negotiation). 
169 See supra Part II.C (discussing the outcome-based approach of Holmes). 
170 Alexander, supra note 123, at 1858, 1860; see also Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason 
in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1375, 1380 (2013) (illustrating the ways in which 
standards and governance are essential to the system of property rights).  
171 Smith, supra note 10, at 1757–58. 
172 Id. at 1751–52.   
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perspective on the dichotomies that judges experience in the course of 
judging.  It is true that focusing on legitimate interests, or justified 
expectations (as Professor Singer advocates),173 will muddy crystalline 
rules that prioritize formal title and exclusion.  A focus on such things as 
outcomes and reliance interests also could add mud.174  Judicial analysis 
under this approach will look more like that seen in traditional courts of 
equity than of law, centering on detailed inquiries into the particular facts 
(interests) and even the moral positions of the parties in given cases.  But 
the interest-outcome approach does nothing to add to the fact that mud 
would inevitably result in such difficult cases.  The question of how many 
disputes are ultimately muddy is a descriptive one that can be answered by 
empirical research.  The question that the interest-outcome approach 
addresses is where in the dispute the muddying should occur—whether in 
defining entitlements or rights or in defining outcomes.  This Article 
argues that by spending time on examining outcomes, judges using the 
interest-outcome approach will more easily be able to imagine and 
innovate a range of outcomes that will protect more of the legitimate 
interests of parties in any given dispute. 
The theoretical groundings for the interest-outcome approach also 
inspire a basic definition for “sharing” as this Article uses that term.  The 
most important feature of sharing under the interest-outcome approach is 
that it results in outcomes that represent compromises of some sort 
between the parties’ varying interests.  Thus, under this approach, the 
opposite of sharing is the kind of all-or-nothing outcomes for which 
litigating parties typically advocate in their pleadings.  Instead, sharing 
would be accomplished by court-imposed or settled outcomes that give 
each party something—but not everything.175  Whose interests and 
judgments would define whether sharing has resulted?  The answer would 
necessarily be that each party’s interests and judgments would be relevant 
to that question.  Under this definition, some types of sharing would be at 
                                                                                                                          
173 See SINGER, supra note 29, at 212 (stating that the norm of justified expectations “invites 
critical inquiry into when expectations are justified, . . . from the standpoint of justice and from that of 
utility” and “invites conversation about the circumstances under which it is fair to impose obligations 
on individuals to respect the interests and property rights of others”). 
174 See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 663–701 
(1988) (discussing the relevance of social relations in determining interests in property and arguing that 
such relations have been marginalized by the free market model).  While the interest-outcome model 
pays close attention to reliance interests, the expansive understanding of “legitimate interests” in my 
model incorporates prospective uses as well.  Id. at 679–92. 
175 The model’s theoretical connection to standards, as distinguished from rules, is particularly 
relevant here, given the literature on bargaining in the shadow of vague standards.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres 
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 
YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 137–38 
(1999); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 
(1995); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002).  
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the core of the interest-outcome model.  These would include uses of 
property that are simultaneous or perhaps even require ongoing 
collaboration or coordination.  But by requiring transfers of property and 
other forms of sharing over time, the model also encompasses sharing that 
does not require an ongoing relationship.  In these latter examples of 
sharing, arguably the most important contribution of this model is at the 
conceptual level: the model creates space for courts and individuals to 
think about property through the lens of sharing rather than through the 
lens of exclusivity.  
While the primary support for this model is in its application, as Part 
III will demonstrate, it is already possible at this stage of the analysis to 
call attention to some of the theoretical and practical implications of the 
interest-outcome approach. 
1.  Theoretical Implications 
First, the interest-outcome approach to resolving property disputes 
lends additional validation to the bundle of rights conception of property 
law that became increasingly well-received during the twentieth century.176  
The bundle conception regards property as comprising a number of 
entitlements, not just one monolithic entitlement denoted by the term 
“ownership.”  According to such a conception, it is entirely possible to 
distribute rights within the bundle to different people.  For example, 
implied easements cases embody the bundle conception by distributing the 
right to use to one party, while reserving ownership of the underlying land 
to another.177 
Though the bundle conception has been the subject of recent 
criticism,178 the implied easements cases provide some evidence that this 
conception is quite richly descriptive of core types of property disputes.  In 
such cases, rights to exclude are not nearly as relevant to dispute resolution 
as the ability to distribute limited aspects of property “ownership” to more 
than one party.  Aside from adding evidence that courts lean toward this 
type of unbundling all the time and in the context of deploying a variety of 
doctrines, the interest-outcome model demonstrates that the ability to 
develop more meaningful outcomes in property cases is greatly enhanced 
by a perspective that views property as multi-stranded, rather than 
monolithic, and pluralistic, rather than monistic.179 
Indeed, another way to advance the abstract claim of this Article is to 
                                                                                                                          
176 Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights?, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193, 195 
(2011). 
177 See Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 809–10 (1906) (providing an example of an implied 
easement, where the court found the defendant had the right to enter the plaintiff’s land to maintain an 
irrigation ditch that served the defendant’s property). 
178 Klein & Robinson, supra note 176, at 195–96 (2011). 
179 Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights, and Properties, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 25–26, 29 (2011). 
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argue that property law currently embodies too narrow a view of property 
entitlements.  And, in fact, this is a predominant theme in an important 
cross-section of current property law scholarship.180  The argument here is 
that property law would benefit from a more varied and broader 
understanding of entitlements,181 one that incorporates, for example, 
obligation as well as right.182  As will be clear in Part III, the interest-
outcome approach incorporates this broader understanding of entitlement, 
as distinguished from the conflation of entitlement with title by some of the 
cathedral literature, and also as distinguished from Calabresi and 
Melamed’s original use of entitlement which, though broader than simply 
title, was still efficiency-focused. 
A second observation about ownership viewed from an interest-
outcome perspective is that it is much less integral to resolving these cases 
than many property lawyers might presume.  In contrast to the cathedral 
framework, in the Holmesian conception of outcome first, the particular 
rights in the bundle truly are derivative of the outcomes.  At times, 
decision makers may not really know what will happen with those rights, 
to whom they will be distributed, and to what extent, until after they 
determine basic outcomes.  Yet, as application of the model to a range of 
property doctrines will demonstrate, disputes are quite capable of 
resolution without starting with a determination of who owns what.  These 
two lessons about ownership add meaningfully to our contemporary 
understanding about the instrumental role of ownership in property law.  
Stripped of its moral force, ownership accomplishes less than we may 
assume. 
2.  Potential Costs 
Perhaps the biggest challenge to the model is the claim that it would 
create uncertainty about property rights, which would translate into 
uncertainty in market transactions.  The uncertainty could result from 
indeterminacy about legal claims and entitlements, since the initial focus 
under this model would be on interests and outcomes.  It could also result 
from consideration of the needs of non-parties.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, it could result in ad hoc decisionmaking that would lead to 
unpredictability in the determination of rights over key resources.  Under 
this scenario, the result would be less efficient market transactions, a 
                                                                                                                          
180 See generally SINGER, supra note 29.   
181 Another intriguing example of the differences that could flow from a broader understanding of 
entitlements is the approach suggested by Professor James Smith in his development of a “law of 
neighbors.”  See James Charles Smith, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbors, 39 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 757, 762–63, 785 (2011) (proposing a “friend model” that recognizes special rights 
and obligations of neighbors). 
182 See Alexander, supra note 11, at 774–75, 778–79 (suggesting an alternative understanding of 
ownership that includes “an aspect of the social obligation inherent in private ownership”). 
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conclusion that challengers might draw on the basis of empirical research 
on tragedies of the commons.183 
The most effective response to this challenge would be to use it as a 
basis for carefully defining the scope of the model.  Most importantly, the 
model is not intended to eliminate claims and entitlements in property law.  
The model would still operate in a context in which one or more parties 
filed suit against one or more defendants on the basis of one or more legal 
causes of action.  These claims would be the basis for a determination 
about whether it was even appropriate in the lawsuit to begin with a 
consideration of appropriate remedies.  In some lawsuits involving adverse 
possession, trespass, implied easement, and nuisance, the answer could 
well be yes.  In many others falling outside of contexts typically regulated 
by Professor Smith’s “governance regimes,” the answer would very often 
be no.184  This traditional means of filing suit would also cabin the extent 
to which non-parties to the lawsuit could influence the development of 
remedies. 
A second response to the challenge of market uncertainty is, of course, 
that enormous uncertainties already exist in the key doctrinal areas in 
which the model is proposed as an alternative.  These uncertainties are 
often a direct result of the “muddying” of property rights in an effort to 
accomplish more equitable distributive results.  For example, the nuisance 
claim depends on a highly fact-specific balancing test of five or more 
factors.185  Similarly, implied easements are notoriously muddy, confusing, 
and inconsistent.186  These are not areas in which bright lines determine 
legal rights.  To the contrary, the very question of ownership depends on 
nuanced questions of intent, reliance, and expectation.  If anything, an 
                                                                                                                          
183 See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Common Property, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 317–23 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing the problems of common 
property as a common pool resource, including the fall of resource values because of limited exchange 
and ineffective allocation of common-property resources); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968) (“Freedom in a commons [will result in] ruin to all.”); 
Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 339–40 (1985) 
(“[S]uch a legal doctrine would assign rights to an open class and, of course, destroy alienability.”). 
184 See Smith, supra note 123, at S453, S455 (defining “governance rules” as those that “pick out 
uses and users in more detail, imposing a more intense informational burden on a smaller audience of 
duty holders”). 
185 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979); see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, 
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 378 (5th ed. 2010) (describing the numerous 
factors courts must look at when evaluating the gravity of harm in a nuisance claim). 
186 See Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation 
Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928, 928 (1988) (summarizing the 
feelings of some of those familiar with the law of servitudes by stating, “Others have described it more 
colorfully ‘as an unspeakable quagmire,’ . . . and an area of the law full of ‘rigid categories, silly 
distinctions, and unreconciled conflicts over basic values’” (quoting E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 480 (2d ed. 1982), and C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 
909 (2d ed. 1985))).   
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interest-outcome approach could leave ownership itself more clear. 
Professors Alexander and Peñalver have provided a third response in 
their review of New Jersey case law on trespass, a jurisprudence that 
proponents of a more monolithic theory of ownership might criticize for its 
“ad hoc-ery.”  As they demonstrate, predictability has developed relatively 
quickly and uncomplicatedly in this jurisprudence.187  There is no reason to 
think that the same could not be expected of the interest-outcome model 
proposed here.  The proposed model has no more criteria for evaluation 
than those encountered by courts in nuisance cases; nor are the criteria any 
more nebulous than the reasonableness standard and similar touchstones.  
(Indeed, they are probably far less so.)  Moreover, there is no reason to 
think that such an approach would not be capable of ripening into 
legislation over time.188 
A second, and somewhat related, challenge to the model is that it 
would go too far in the direction of redistribution, particularly to the extent 
that remedies could be based more on prospective uses than on reliance 
interests.189  Here again, the most effective response would be to clarify the 
extent to which future uses would be affirmed in remedial grants.  The 
model is decidedly not arguing in favor of granting remedies on the basis 
of completely prospective uses.  In such circumstances, the potential claim 
or counterclaim would be so abstract as to make a remedy virtually 
impossible to grant.  Rather, the relevance of future uses is more in the 
crafting of the scope of remedy than in the decision about whether to grant 
one in the first place.  The point of considering future uses is to garner the 
most benefit from use as a remedial tool, but not to incorporate prospective 
behavior as a basis for determining need.  This is a critical basis for 
distinguishing this model from overtly redistributive schemes. 
III.  THE IMPULSE TO SHARE IN MODERN PRACTICE 
The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that, in core areas of 
property law, judges are drawn to sharing.  For example, in nuisance cases, 
judges rely on balancing tests to acknowledge that both parties have 
rights.190  In adverse possession cases and implied easements, judges 
                                                                                                                          
187 GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 
THEORY 141–42, fig.7.1 (2012). 
188 Id. at 140.   
189 Cf. Singer, supra note 174, at 679, 692 (discussing instances in which property rights are 
redistributed from the owner to the non-owner thereby protecting the legitimate interests of the more 
vulnerable party in relying on access to certain resources and the relationships that such access makes 
possible). 
190 See, e.g., Page Cnty. Appliance Ctr. v. Honeywell, 347 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Iowa 1984) 
(recognizing that in nuisance claims “[o]ne’s use of property should not unreasonably interfere with or 
disturb a neighbor’s comfortable and reasonable use and enjoyment of his or her estate” and that “[a] 
fair test of whether the operation of lawful trade or industry constitute a nuisance is the reasonableness 
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evaluate the uses made by parties, and on that basis, they recognize 
rights.191  Even in trespass cases, judges create exceptions to the absolute 
right to exclude.192  The core insight from this analysis is that judges often 
lean toward exactly what this Article claims as the core benefit of a 
Holmesian approach to dispute resolution.   
However, because these same judges operate in a title-focused system, 
they tend not to act on their instinct toward sharing other than by 
recognizing relatively metaphysical “rights” to share.  Were they to begin 
with the question of interests and outcomes, these judges could actualize 
their intuitions by granting parties the core benefit of property sharing.  
Instead, at the point of granting remedies, they default to a more 
formalistic affirmation of bundled ownership.  In nuisance, that remedial 
turn to formalism takes the form of damages for plaintiffs (rather than 
property sharing) where the defendants’ uses are socially beneficial.  In 
adverse possession, the remedy is a blunt injunction recognizing complete 
ownership in the adverse possessor.  By allocating rights to use, remedies 
in cases recognizing implied easements are the most reflective of the 
sharing impulse.  But as this Part shows, they still formalistically bundle 
such use rights into a form of limited ownership. 
A.  Nuisance (and Negative Easements) 
In the late 1970s, Glenn Prah built a house that reflected the national 
energy consumption crisis by incorporating solar panels on the roof.193  
The panels collected enough energy to provide heat and hot water to Prah’s 
house.194  Prah’s was one of the first houses in a subdivision, the zoning for 
which at the time did not appear to contemplate the shadowing and other 
effects that improvements on individual lots might have on the solar panel 
systems on other houses in the subdivision.195  Some time later, Richard 
Maretti bought the lot next door to Prah’s lot and planned to build a house 
                                                                                                                          
of conducting it in the manner, at the place, and under the circumstances shown by the evidence”).  
191 See, e.g., Granite Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ill. 1987) (stating that 
in implied easements cases “courts find particular facts suggestive of intent on the part of the parties” 
and that “proof of the prior use is evidence that the parties probably intended an easement, on the 
presumption that the grantor and the grantee would have intended to continue an important or necessary 
use of the land known to them that was apparently continuous and permanent in its nature”). 
192 See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371–72 (N.J. 1971) (providing an example of an 
exception to the absolute right to exclude, and explaining that “the ownership of real property does not 
include the right to bar access to governmental services available to migrant workers” before finding 
that “there was no trespass”).  While this Part focuses largely on doctrines described by Professor 
Smith as falling within governance regimes, it makes the same observations about the law of trespass, 
which exclusion theorists hold up as a paradigmatic example of the value of exclusion theory in 
explaining the real world. 
193 Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Wis. 1982). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 198–99 (Callow, J., dissenting). 
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on it.  When Prah learned of Maretti’s plans, he informed Maretti that his 
proposed construction would cause a shadow to fall across Prah’s solar 
panels, possibly compromising his heating system.196  The solution, 
according to Prah, was for Maretti to move his house a few feet back from 
its proposed location.197  Maretti refused to change his plans to respond to 
Prah’s concerns, and he began construction.198  Both parties’ improvements 
complied with local zoning and building requirements.199 
Prah sued Maretti on three grounds,200 two of which are relevant to this 
discussion.  Aside from a statutory claim, he claimed that Maretti’s 
construction constituted a private nuisance and also that he had acquired a 
solar easement by prior appropriation over Maretti’s property.201  In the 
face of a zealous dissent arguing (with good reason) that the building of an 
ordinary single family home could not constitute a private nuisance,202 the 
majority held that Prah had stated a claim for private nuisance under which 
relief could be granted.203  In so doing, the majority relied on a number of 
sources of law, none of which were binding on the court.204  These 
included the English common law doctrines recognizing express easements 
as well as negative prescriptive easements to receive sunlight (the so-called 
doctrine of “ancient lights”),205 spite fence laws prohibiting neighbors from 
blocking each other’s light out of spite,206 and a Wisconsin case adopting 
the reasonable use rule with respect to surface water.207 
Primarily, however, the court relied on three policy reasons that in 
large measure embody the prescriptive model advocated for in this Article.  
First, the court found that use of property is increasingly regulated for the 
benefit of the “general welfare.”208  Second, the court recognized that 
Prah’s use of sunlight as energy was part of a new social and economic 
trend that contributed to economic development and welfare.209  Finally, 
the court balanced such a use against the competing use of land for 
unrestricted development.210 
Although Prah does not represent the majority rule on the question of 
                                                                                                                          
196 Id. at 184 (majority opinion).  
197 Id. at 185. 
198 Id. at 184. 
199 Id. at 184–85. 
200 Id. at 186. 
201 Id.  
202 Id. at 196–97 (Callow, J., dissenting). 
203 Id. at 191 (majority opinion). 
204 Id. at 187–89. 
205 Id. at 188. 
206 Id. at 188–89. 
207 Id. at 190 (citing State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 1974)).   
208 Id. at 189. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 189–90. 
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whether people can have rights to light and air beyond the boundaries of 
their own land,211 it is fairly typical of nuisance cases in one key respect.  
In Prah, as in so many nuisance cases, the court recognized, affirmed, and 
even produced shared rights.212  In this core area of property law, the 
instinct exists among decision makers to recognize more than one party’s 
interests to the same parcel of land.  Perhaps this is so because courts view 
these cases as involving two landowners with conflicting rights.213  Perhaps 
also the pull toward sharing is easier in the overlapping space between torts 
and property, represented by the factors listed in the Restatement of Torts 
for consideration in balancing harm against utility of conduct claimed to be 
a nuisance.214  By relying on a broadly inclusive balancing test, nuisance 
claims seem more adaptable to an interest-outcome approach than much of 
property law. 
For example, by focusing on Prah’s limited interest in sharing 
Maretti’s property, the court recognized Prah’s reliance on access to 
sunlight.215  It explicitly contemplated the national context in which the use 
of alternative energy sources was becoming increasingly imperative.216  In 
so doing, the court gave more opportunity, for longer-term considerations 
of planning and coordination.217  By balancing these considerations, the 
                                                                                                                          
211 See SINGER, supra note 185, at 409 (“The vast majority of courts in the United States would 
hold that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, owners have absolute rights to develop their 
property without liability for any interference with their neighbor’s interests in light and air.”). 
212 See, e.g., Osborne v. Power, 908 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Ark. 1995) (enforcing an injunction against 
homeowners enjoining them from placing massive Christmas light displays on their property); Locklin 
v. Lafayette, 867 P.2d 724, 756 (Cal. 1994) (affirming judgment for plaintiff property owners for 
damage to their creek side properties through storm water runoff, entering judgment against city, 
county, flood control district, and other public entities); Westland Skating Ctr., Inc. v. Gus Machado 
Buick, Inc., 542 So. 2d 959, 964 (Fla. 1989) (recognizing that damage caused by interference with 
surface waters flowing from improved property can constitute a legal claim for which relief can be 
granted); Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So. 2d 1071, 1080 (La. 1985) (granting a neighbor’s injunction 
that enjoined a homeowner from operating a display consisting of lights and music during the 
Christmas season); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956) (affirming a judgment 
requiring a contractor to complete drainage piping to prevent further water damage to a landowner’s 
property); Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519, 523 (Va. 2007) (holding that encroaching trees and 
plants may be regarded as a nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of 
actual harm to adjoin property); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979) (stating 
that “an intentional invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable 
if . . . the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actors conduct” which recognizes the shared 
rights of the land owner as well the rights of a person invading that land). 
213 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696 (Cal. 1996).  We will, 
however, see this in doctrines resolving conflicts between claimants to a single parcel too.  
214 When considering the gravity of the harm, these factors include the social value of the use 
invaded and the suitability of such use to the character of the locality.  Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 192 n.16. 
215 Id. at 191. 
216 Id. at 189. 
217 Indeed, all three of the policy reasons presented by the court, especially when taken together, 
reflect such an interest.  See id. at 190 (“The law of private nuisance is better suited to resolve land 
owners’ disputes about property development . . . .”). 
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court effectively balanced individual economic considerations, including 
the marketability of each party’s property, with and against broader 
societal concerns.  Moreover, the court’s analysis was forward-looking, 
considering the harms that could result from a failure of Prah’s solar 
energy system and the benefits that could accrue from his future use of that 
system.218 
Of course, this instinct in favor of sharing can only go so far in 
mainstream nuisance law.  This is most easily demonstrated by considering 
the question of doctrinal plausibility: as the dissent points out, it is difficult 
to swallow the claim that the construction of a single-family house could 
be a nuisance.219  This complication and the difficulty of providing 
adequate notice to those who may interfere with access to light are the two 
primary reasons why the majority of jurisdictions refuse to recognize rights 
to light and air.220 
But although courts produce shared rights quite regularly in these 
cases, at the point of allocating remedies, courts disrupt the natural 
repercussions of these shared rights by formalistically affirming a more 
bundled notion of ownership.  Ironically enough, while rights are relatively 
less hard-edged in nuisance law, resulting in more rhetorical and doctrinal 
recognition of the need for accommodation among “neighbors,” courts 
effectively snap back to attention and formalistically affirm ownership as 
the ultimate right at the remedial stage.  In nuisance cases, this particular 
remedial turn takes the form of a grant of damages where the “socially 
beneficial” nature of the defendant’s ownership warrants protecting its 
bundled form.221  The preference for damages in cases such as this exalts 
bundled ownership by limiting the extent to which parties can, practically 
speaking, share property.  It may be the case that both parties have “rights” 
to a given property, but if a party receives damages in recognition of its 
rights, that party’s ability to use, transfer, and access the property will be 
nonexistent.  By contrast, an interest-outcome approach would make clear 
whether damages would be of any real value to the plaintiff. 
The facts of the Prah case provide an archetypical template for such a 
move.  Given the veneration of the single-family home in American law,222 
                                                                                                                          
218 The same considerations ought to come into play in cases dealing with other doctrines.  See, 
e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 164–66 (Wis. 1997) (explaining that the 
inquiry into trespass ought to have considered the cost and danger of using the icy road that was 
available for transporting a mobile home). 
219 Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 196–197 (Callow, J., dissenting).  
220 SINGER, supra note 185, at 409–11. 
221 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (1979) (acknowledging the possibility of 
damages as compensation for nuisance). 
222 See A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not 
Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 189–90 (2009) (noting that “[h]ome ownership is part of the 
American dream because of the economic security it gives homeowners” and that being a homeowner 
carries “culturally significant status”); Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: 
 
 688 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:647 
it would be reasonable to expect courts adopting Prah’s holding to find 
conduct like Maretti’s to be socially beneficial.  Such a conclusion would 
confound the multi-textured use analysis undertaken by the majority 
opinion in determining the question of appropriate use in the first place.  
Indeed, Calabresi and Melamed’s central point is particularly apt in a case 
like Prah.  The distributive effect of damages in place of injunctive relief 
would be quite significant.  What use would money damages really be to 
Prah if Maretti could go on building, thereby effectively destroying the 
function and value of Prah’s energy system?  Perhaps even more 
importantly, how would such an outcome uphold the broader social 
concerns raised by the Court? 
The challenge in cases such as Prah is to find a basis for balancing 
outcomes without being bound by some of the constraints of nuisance 
doctrine.  For example, in a nuisance case, the question of what uses may 
occur on a particular parcel is initially answered by who owns it.223  It is 
not typical for a plaintiff claiming a nuisance to receive a remedy allowing 
the plaintiff access to the defendant’s property for the purposes of 
monitoring the defendant’s use or sharing in certain types of use.  Rather, 
the contest is viewed as one between two landowners with conflicting 
interests about freedom versus security, in which each cannot access or use 
the other’s property.224 
B.  Adverse Possession, Trespass, and Implied Easements 
1.  Adverse Possession 
Contrast with nuisance the doctrine of adverse possession, first in its 
atypical application in a case where a formalist recognition of ownership 
runs amuck, and then in its more typical manifestation, where ownership 
still results in a formalistic divestment of one party’s property interests in 
favor of bundling ownership in the other.  Briefly stated, by focusing on 
property use, adverse possession doctrine provides a rich doctrinal 
mechanism to promote sharing.  However, in current adverse possession 
doctrine, that potential is utterly inchoate because, at the remedial stage, 
courts do the opposite of creating opportunities to share and instead grant 
fully bundled ownership to either the true owner or the adverse 
possessor.225 
First, the atypical case: In 1982, Elizabeth and Mark Whitcombe took 
                                                                                                                          
The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 
952–53 (2008) (noting that homeowners are “currently privileged within our society” and are “afforded 
both significant monetary benefits and social capital”). 
223 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D, 822; 1 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL 
PROPERTY § 64.02[3][a] (2011). 
224 SINGER, supra note 29, at 36. 
225 SINGER, supra note 185, at 281. 
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up residence at 98 Ditmars Street, a single family house in the City Island 
area of the Bronx.226  At the time they moved in, the house was “empty and 
overgrown and [the Whitcombes] believed it to be abandoned.”227  The 
Whitcombes were artists at the time, and they had a child.228  By their own 
account, having just had difficulties with their landlord, they felt 
“desperation” in their need to find housing.229  Upon moving into the 
house, the Whitcombes cleaned, repaired, and added “improvements” to 
the exterior and the surrounding lot; acquired telephone and electric 
services in their name; and directed their mail to that address.230  They also 
set up an artists’ studio in the house and put a sign in the front yard 
advertising their art.231  The Whitcombes lived in and maintained the house 
for almost twenty years.232  In short, they made physical use of the property 
like any long-term homeowner. 
In 1998, Crystal Waterview Corporation bought the property in a 
mortgage foreclosure action, and in 1999, it sold the property to Haim 
Joseph.233  Joseph filed an action for ejectment, and the Whitcombes 
counterclaimed that they had acquired ownership of the property by 
adverse possession.234  When asked why they had moved into a house they 
knew was not theirs, Mark Whitcombe answered that he had assumed the 
house was abandoned because it was in a floodplain and very difficult to 
“reclaim” and maintain.235 
On appeal, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment and rejected the Whitcombes’ claim of adverse possession.236  
The court held that, despite engaging in “open conduct consistent with 
ownership,”237 the Whitcombes did not enter the property under “claim of 
right,” but rather as mere “licensees.”238  In making use of the property, 
according to the court, there was nothing more that the Whitcombes ought 
to have done.239  The problem was with their expectation of ownership.  As 
the court expressed a number of times, because they were mere 
                                                                                                                          
226 Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).   
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id.  They did not, however, pay taxes on the property.  Id. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 45–46. 
236 Id. at 48. 
237 Id. at 46. 
238 Id. at 47. 
239 See id. (“The present case, in which an urban lot, improved by a residential dwelling in a 
community occupied by a population that seems to be more settled than transient, and where people 
tend to know who owns what property, is unusual in that defendants managed to live, rent free, as long 
as they had in the subject dwelling.”). 
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“squatters,”240 they possessed no legitimate expectation of lawful 
“possession” when they entered the property, and their use of the property 
thus never “ripen[ed]” into a claim of right.241 
The Joseph case is exceptional in the law of adverse possession for 
making an issue out of the concept of “claim of right,” a requirement in 
adverse possession doctrine that is quite underdeveloped, if not even pro 
forma.242  Subsequent commentary on the case suggests that the court 
invoked this rather empty concept for the purpose of dealing expansively 
with the growing concern over squatters in New York City.243  More 
importantly for the purposes of this Article, the case is also exceptional in 
adverse possession jurisprudence because it exalts a formalistic notion of 
ownership—while using a doctrine known for undermining at least some 
aspects of formalism—in favor of recognizing ownership on the basis of 
use and reliance.  Contrary to the vast majority of adverse possession case 
law, which finds a claim of right on the basis of treatment of the property 
as an ordinary owner would,244 Joseph held that even when someone uses 
the property extensively over a long period of time and in a manner that is 
typically privileged as appropriate use, a more formal and subjective 
concept of ownership takes priority over such use.245 
In this respect, Joseph is an exaggerated, almost unfair, example of the 
problem identified in this Article.  To the extent that adverse possession is 
the best (if still imperfect) example of use as a remedial force, Joseph is a 
dramatic case for demonstrating how the bundled view of ownership can 
cause mischief.  Joseph and indeed many adverse possession cases are 
excellent candidates for remedies involving sharing because conflicting use 
interests are often absent.  As in Joseph, the true owner is often physically 
                                                                                                                          
240 Id. at 46–48.  The court used the term “squatter” seven times in the opinion.  Id. 
241 Id. at 47. 
242 See SINGER, supra note 185, at 299 (stating that the majority of states collapse the “claim of 
right” element into the adversity element, simply requiring that adverse possessors act toward the 
property “as an average owner would act” while a small number of states impose a test requiring that 
the adverse possessor intentionally dispossess the record owner). 
243 See Robert E. Parella, Real Property, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 703, 720 (2001) (noting the 
anomalous nature of the Joseph court’s focus on squatters and opining that this may be due to a judicial 
hostility toward “wrongdoer[s],” which “may be reinforced when the property is urban rather than rural 
land, as the First Department explicitly acknowledged in Joseph”). 
244 See, e.g., Bearden v. Ellison, 560 So. 2d 1042, 1044–45 (Ala. 1990) (“An adverse possessor 
need only use the land ‘in a manner consistent with its nature and character—by such acts as would 
ordinarily be performed by the true owners of such land in such condition.’” (quoting Hand v. Stanard, 
392 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Ala. 1980))); Almond v. Anderegg, 557 P.2d 220, 223 (Or. 1976) (“Under our 
decisions plaintiff must show that she occupied or used the land as would the ordinary owner of the 
same type of land, taking into account the uses for which the land was suitable.”); Burkhardt v. Smith, 
115 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Wis. 1962) (“Actual occupancy means the ordinary use to which the land is 
capable and such as an owner would make of it.”). 
245 See Joseph, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (holding the defendants’ long-term use of the property did not 
ripen into a claim of right).   
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absent from the property246 and may well be interested instead in using it 
for purposes of investment or future transfer.  Thus, cases like Joseph have 
the potential for allowing so-called squatters to improve abandoned 
properties and produce other benefits, both private and social, from their 
uses.247  But the remedies in such cases fail to recognize that potential. 
Joseph aside, the more standard adverse possession doctrine is a 
convenient illustration of this point and more broadly of the same double-
minded response to conflicting interests to property that is apparent in 
nuisance doctrine.  In the more typical adverse possession cases, courts 
flirt with the possibility of sharing by investigating the uses made by the 
non-owning adverse possessor.248  These analyses serve the important 
purpose of demonstrating that use of property can have major distributive 
consequences.  Moreover, given its long and successful history in 
American jurisprudence, adverse possession doctrine proves that our legal 
system can easily accommodate doctrines that allocate remedies on the 
basis of use.  At the remedial phase, however, courts again devolve to 
ownership formalism, though the remedial affirmation of ownership takes 
a different form than it does in nuisance.  Rather than award damages to 
the adverse possessor or—for that matter—to the true owner, courts reward 
use that rises to the level of adverse possession with a blunt injunction.  
The remedy is fully bundled ownership for the party who made the 
appropriate use of the property.  Anything less than such a complete level 
of use is rewarded with no recognition of rights at all. 
Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz is a fairly typical example.  In that case, the 
dissenting opinion engaged in a more familiar adverse possession analysis 
by considering whether the totality of the Lutzes’ actions—namely, the 
clearing of an unmaintained and overgrown lot, gardening, raising poultry, 
cutting timber, operating a “truck farm,” and keeping a very small dwelling 
on it—qualified as sufficient use to warrant ownership by adverse 
possession.249  Given the testimony by neighbors that the Lutzes were 
overspreading their property with “junk, rubbish and debris,”250 it is not 
surprising that the court rejected the Lutzes’ claim of ownership by adverse 
possession.251 
As the dissent pointed out in Van Valkenburgh, the majority opinion 
drew a disturbingly narrow picture of “appropriate” use that favored 
                                                                                                                          
246 Id. at 45.   
247 See Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 211–12 
(2010) (arguing that the rule against abandonment of real property embodied by the doctrine of adverse 
possession serves important reconstructive and marketability-enhancement functions).  
248 See, e.g., Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28, 28–30 (N.Y. 1952) (analyzing the various 
ways the possessors used the land and if it sufficiently established adverse possession). 
249 Id. at 31 (Fuld, J., dissenting). 
250 Id. at 30 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
251 Id.  
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aesthetics over subsistence, a move that is only partly surprising given the 
classic uses (farming and small business) that the Lutzes were making of 
the disputed property.252  One has to wonder whether the all-or-nothing 
remedial scheme raises the stakes in cases such as this, especially where 
neighborhood opposition exists.  Could any part of the Lutzes’ use have 
been allowed by the court, especially if that more limited use would not 
have drawn the opposition of the neighbors or even the true owner?  Such a 
question is completely irrelevant in adverse possession doctrine. 
Even when adverse possession cases do protect use and reliance 
interests to a greater extent than Van Valkenburgh and Joseph, the remedial 
extremism in adverse possession doctrine produces several failures.  First, 
because the ultimate question is whether to completely dispossess the true 
owners, rather than whether to allow sharing of property, most courts do 
not consider the relevance of the adverse possessor’s use to neighborhood 
social and economic relations.  In Van Valkenburgh, for example, it was 
immaterial for the Court to balance the neighbors’ disgust over the 
unsightliness of the Lutzes’ business against the contributions that the 
business was making to the neighborhood and local economy.  The Lutzes 
did not really have the option within the adverse possession prima facie 
case to present evidence about whether some neighbors benefited from or 
appreciated their occupation of the property.  The question was narrowly 
construed as one of “actual occupation” as demonstrated by how an 
ordinary person would make use of such a property.253  Thus, the 
neighbors’ disgust was purportedly relevant only to show that an ordinary 
user would not keep junk and rubbish on her property.254 
Second, despite the blight of having “wild,”255 “overgrown,”256 and 
apparently abandoned lots in the neighborhood in both of these cases, the 
particular role played by the adverse possessor in salvaging abandoned 
property was ignored, and understandably so given its irrelevance to the 
inquiry in adverse possession claims.  This is a significant loss because so 
much of the value of property use relates to the information it can provide 
about an individual’s position in a broader social phenomenon.  In these 
cases, the phenomenon is that of property abandonment, or at least of 
owner absenteeism, but it is by no means the only example.  Adverse 
possession and trespass cases provide a rich array of other examples, 
including dispossession of Native Americans’ land,257 protection of privacy 
                                                                                                                          
252 See id. at 33 (Fuld, J., dissenting) (asserting the occupants’ failure to use the entire property 
should not prohibit a claim of adverse possession). 
253 Id. at 30 (majority opinion). 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 31 (Fuld, J., dissenting). 
256 Id.; Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). 
257 See, e.g., Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 307 (Alaska 1990) (evaluating an 
ejectment claim on a parcel of land that was included in a native allotment application). 
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and free speech rights,258 and the aspiration of putting land to more 
productive use.259  But again, positioning the individual in a broader social 
context is irrelevant when the inquiry focuses on complete, rather than 
shared, occupation. 
A third failure is the length of time that is required for such use to 
ripen into ownership.  Typically, the time periods required in cases of 
prescription measure in terms of decades;260 indeed, they are often longer 
in cases of intentional dispossession.261  Although the passage of time has 
served as a convincing theoretical justification for the radical transfer of 
ownership that adverse possession produces, it imposes significant costs.  
When the adverse possession is viewed as part of a social phenomenon, the 
length of time required for rights to ripen creates instability as parties wait 
to assert rights and to develop land in explicit coordination with neighbors, 
local government, and others.  The Joseph case presents another cost of the 
lengthy time period:  the possibility that a bona fide purchaser could 
accidentally acquire the property, thereby presenting a more sympathetic 
conflict for a court to have to resolve.262  Of course, such lengthy time 
periods would not be necessary if sharing, rather than ripening, was the end 
result of adverse possession analyses. 
In practical effect, adverse possession doctrine thus limits the range of 
outcomes that ought to be possible in these cases in a number of key 
respects.  First, it precludes the possibility of shared or group rights, 
because ownership by groups is harder to define, manage, and protect.263 
Second, it precludes consideration of proposed uses that have not yet been 
                                                                                                                          
258 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76–77 (1980) (evaluating a 
property owner’s right to eject individuals exercising their free speech and petition rights); State v. 
Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 370–71 (N.J. 1971) (evaluating a property owner’s trespass claim against 
attorneys seeking to speak with clients in private living quarters on property). 
259 See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2435 
(2001) (asserting that adverse possession forces lazy owners to use their land in a productive manner). 
260 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 185, at 300 (summarizing the statutes of limitation in different 
states).  They are, however, much shorter in some western states.  RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 79 (2d ed. 1999). 
261 See SINGER, supra note 185, at 300 (comparing state statutes of limitation for good faith 
possession with those for bad faith possession). 
262 Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). 
263 Modern manifestations of this ancient doctrine are, however, far more comfortable with 
defining group rights.  For example, it is much more possible today for the public to acquire a 
prescriptive easement in land.  See, e.g., Weidner v. Alaska Dep’t of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 860 
P.2d 1205, 1209 (Alaska 1993) (holding that a public way may be created by public use of private 
property for ten years); Fears v. Y.J. Land Corp., 539 N.W.2d 306, 308 (N.D. 1995) (stating that public 
roads may be established by prescription under state law).  In addition, environmental resources are 
often managed on the basis of group rights.  See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (discussing problems 
of collective action faced by individuals using common-pool environmental resources and analyzing 
various group-based solutions).   
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acted upon by either party.264  Finally, it limits the possibility of hybrid 
uses that take advantage of the sophistication in long-term land use 
planning that has developed in the last few decades.265 
2.  Trespass 
A brief exploration of the flipside of adverse possession, namely the 
doctrine of trespass, reveals much the same pattern, although it is arguably 
more noteworthy here because exclusion theorists use trespass doctrine to 
demonstrate the value of exclusion theory.  Consider State v. Shack,266 
another iconic case.  In that case, Shack and Tejeras, a legal services 
lawyer and field worker for a poverty alleviation organization respectively, 
entered Tedesco’s farm to find two migrant workers who both worked and 
lived on the farm.267  Tedesco confronted them and agreed to let Tejeras 
meet with one worker in order to provide basic medical aid.268  However, 
upon learning that Shack wished to see a worker for the purpose of 
providing legal services, Tedesco refused to allow Shack to meet with the 
worker except in Tedesco’s presence.269  When Shack rejected this 
condition, Tedesco brought a complaint for criminal trespass against both 
Shack and Tejeras.270 
The discussion of rights in State v. Shack reminds us that there are 
important exceptions to trespass rules that in practice allow people to enter 
and use property that they do not own.271  But that is indeed the point: the 
exceptions and transfers apply to the absolutist definition of ownership, 
with the baseline for exception-making always being ownership by the 
plaintiff.  For example, teachers of first-year property courses in law 
                                                                                                                          
264 Indeed, there is often a long period of prescription and/or a requirement of a reliance interest. 
See SINGER, supra note 185, at 307 (describing a moral basis of protecting reliance by an adverse 
possessor as a justification for adverse possession doctrine). 
265 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING 
WALLS 9–10 (1999) (defending the values of decentralization); PATSY HEALEY, COLLABORATIVE 
PLANNING: SHAPING PLACES IN FRAGMENTED SOCIETIES 156 (2d ed. 2006) (highlighting the complex 
“contemporary reality of land and property markets”); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) 
the City, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1, 58 (2004) (advocating for the adoption of mixed-use environments to 
encourage the improvement of many urban communities). 
266 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
267 Id. at 370. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 370–71. 
271 See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 303 P.2d 721, 723 (Cal. 1956) (holding that unauthorized entry 
was privileged when police officers heard moaning coming from inside and knew a sick man lived in 
the residence); Rossi v. DelDuca, 181 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Mass. 1962) (holding that trespasser was 
privileged to do so when the need to escape a dangerous dog required her to cross the property of 
another and carving out an exception to a statute providing immunity from liability for dog bites to 
property owner); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189–90 (Vt. 1908) (holding that plaintiff’s need to moor 
a boat to defendant’s dock during a sudden storm deprived defendant of the right to exclude). 
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schools often use Shack to make a meal of the “public interest” exception 
to trespass.272  The most common manifestations of the public interest in 
trespass cases include anti-discrimination imperatives,273 the rights of the 
public vis-à-vis private owners who have opened their property to the 
public,274 and notions of necessity.275  As much as they shock new law 
students, with their relatively more Blackstonian views of property rights, 
these exceptions have more rhetorical than practical value in the wide arc 
of trespass cases.  At the metaphysical level, they claim that owners must 
share property, but at the practical level, they produce only limited sharing.  
In general, the opportunity to share is specifically and carefully defined, 
while the backdrop right of ownership encompasses a default right of use 
that is both broad and general.  Thus, in the case of discrimination, only 
certain categories of people are protected; owners are at liberty to exclude 
arbitrarily anyone who does not fall within those categories.276  Similarly, 
in the case of access to businesses, the majority rule remains that only 
                                                                                                                          
272 See, e.g., Shack, 277 A.2d at 374 (holding that government workers have a privilege to enter 
property so as to provide migrant workers with legal and medical services). 
273 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170–72 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
prohibits privately operated non-religious schools from excluding qualified children on the basis of 
race); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970) (holding that application of a state-
enforced custom of refusing service to whites in the company of African-Americans violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits racial discrimination in the 
market for selling or leasing real property). 
274 See, e.g., State v. Tauvar, 461 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Me. 1983) (holding that a church could not 
revoke its invitation to the general public to come to its meeting hall unless it had a justification); In re 
S.M.S., 675 S.E.2d 44, 45–46 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“When premises are open to the public, ‘the 
occupants of those premises have the implied consent of the owner/lessee/possessor to be on the 
premises, and that consent can be revoked only upon some showing the occupants have committed acts 
sufficient to render the implied consent void.’” (quoting State v. Marcoplos, 572 S.E.2d 820, 821–22 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002))); Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1389 (Pa. 1981) (holding that outdoor 
grounds on a private college campus were open to the public within the meaning of a trespass statute 
such that the defendants who were arrested for distributing leaflets on those grounds in violation of the 
statute were absolved of liability for trespass). 
275 See, e.g., United States v. Schoon, 955 F.2d 1238, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 1991), amended and 
superseded on other grounds, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the necessity defense 
“justifies criminal acts taken to avert a greater harm, maximizing social welfare by allowing a crime to 
be committed where the social benefits of the crime outweigh the social costs of failing to commit the 
crime”); Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 221–22 (Minn. 1910) (holding the defendant 
not liable for trespass because it had a self-protection privilege to tie its ship to the plaintiff's dock in 
order to avoid its ship being damaged badly by a tremendous storm); Hager v. Tire Recyclers, Inc., 901 
P.2d 948, 952 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), adhered to as modified on other grounds on reconsideration, 
906 P.2d 842, 844 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that “[t]he privilege of public necessity is limited to 
action necessary to avert an impending public disaster”). 
276 See, e.g., Keck v. Graham Hotel Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[a]n 
inference of discrimination arises where a plaintiff is deprived of services ‘while similarly situated 
persons outside the protected class were not’” (quoting Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 
862, 872 (6th Cir. 2001))). 
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innkeepers and common carriers have no right to arbitrarily exclude.277  It 
is certainly not the case that anyone who pays a predetermined (or 
determinable) amount may enter and use the plaintiff’s property. 
Thus, in Shack, the relevance of the migrant workers’ labor on 
Tedesco’s land to the economic and social structure of the surrounding 
area was not considered, perhaps partly because they were not claiming 
any rights by prescription.  Nor was the broader social phenomenon of 
migrant worker exploitation a basis for allowing them to remain on and use 
Tedesco’s property.278  The case was one of access to those workers, but 
even the broadest interpretation of the opinion would not read into it a 
continuing right to remain on the land.  In short, because Tedesco’s rights 
of ownership were incontestable, the migrant workers’ use of the land 
served no doctrinal function.  Their use of the land was extensive, 
productive, and vigorous.  But, in a case about trespass, their status as 
workers earned them no opportunities vis-à-vis continued use of the 
land.279 
Described differently, the remedies in these core areas of property law 
fail to take full advantage of the many possibilities that inhere in the 
equitable concept of injunctive relief.  The practical result is that access to 
and use of property remain bundled within the unitary concept of 
ownership without opportunity for nuanced development.  In Shack, as 
well as in Joseph and Van Valkenburgh, the law could not contemplate an 
outcome that directly protected shared use among the owner, the 
possessor(s), and non-owners.  The courts implicitly recognized a limited 
right to share by holding that the workers had a right to receive visitors, but 
the right was abstractly defined, leaving open questions about what that 
right encompassed and its extensiveness.  Had such opportunities existed, 
the results could have been far less severe and thus less radical than the 
results in each of these three cases.  Instead, the absolute nature of 
ownership prevented the courts from contemplating less radical solutions, 
some of which could have resulted in fairer distribution and an even 
                                                                                                                          
277 See, e.g., Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 366 A.2d 641, 646 (N.J. 1976) (analogizing 
hospitals to common carriers and holding that they can only exclude where there is a rational basis for 
doing so); see also Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private 
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1448–49 (1996) (arguing that the current law’s majority limitation 
of public accommodation rules to inns and common-carriers is unjustifiable and should be extended to 
all businesses that hold themselves out as open to the public). 
278 The Court discussed the exploitation of the workers at relatively great length, but not for that 
purpose.  State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372–73 (N.J. 1971). 
279 As Professor Singer discusses in his analysis of Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United 
States Steel Corp., there are clear bases in current law for granting such opportunities.  Singer, supra 
note 174, at 614–18 (citing Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 
1264, 1265 (6th Cir. 1980)).  Moreover, it is also the case that they may have been able to raise wage 
and other labor claims if they had filed suit based on their employment status.  My point here, however, 
is that such claims ought to have been relevant to this property lawsuit as well. 
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greater level of doctrinal stability. 
3.  Implied Easements 
To a very profound extent, such remedies do exist in property law, and 
not just at the margins.  They exist in the form of implied easements that 
crop up to remedy injustices in a range of circumstances, for example, 
where an adverse possessor merely “uses” property rather than “fully 
occupying” it;280 where a party relies on the right to continue using 
property as a result of permission once extended;281 where a party has a 
stark necessity to continue using property;282 or even where a less stark 
necessity exists, so long as the use was sufficiently open, obvious, and 
continuous.283 
The 1906 case of Stoner v. Zucker284 is a classic example.  In that case, 
the defendants, with the plaintiff’s permission, invested seven thousand 
dollars to build a ditch on the plaintiff’s land for the purpose of carrying 
water for irrigation from a nearby river to their own land.285  Despite the 
plaintiff’s revocation of that permission just one year later, the defendants 
“continuously entered upon plaintiff’s land, making repairs upon the ditch 
and restoring the same where it was broken and washed away.”286  
Moreover, they “threaten[ed]” to continue to do so.287  The court applied 
the traditional doctrine of easement by estoppel, holding that where either 
money, labor, or both are expended in reliance upon a “mere parol 
license,” such:  
[L]icense becomes irrevocable, [and] the licensee will have a 
right of entry upon the lands of the licensor for the purpose of 
maintaining his structures or, in general, his rights under his 
license, and the license will continue for so long a time as the 
nature of it calls for.288 
Stoner and the other implied easements cases are perhaps the most 
unmistakable examples of courts creating shared interests in property.  In a 
wide range of circumstances where parties claim rights to access and use of 
                                                                                                                          
280 See, e.g., Cmty. Feed Store, Inc. v. Ne. Culvert Corp., 559 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Vt. 1989) 
(holding that where a claimant marshals enough evidence to prove “the general outlines consistent with 
the pattern of use” of a prescriptive easement throughout the relevant period, “it has met its burden on 
that issue”). 
281 See, e.g., Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 809–10 (Cal. 1906) (easement by estoppel). 
282 See, e.g., Othen v. Rosier, 226 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. 1950) (easement by necessity). 
283 See, e.g., Granite Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ill. 1987) (easements 
implied from prior use). 
284 83 P. 808. 
285 Id. at 809. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. at 810. 
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“rights of way” over the land of others, including where permission was 
initially granted and revoked and where permission was never given, 
where the need was great, where the parties relied on access for their own 
economic gain, and where parties relied on informal mores or assumptions 
of neighborliness, courts have required landowners to share their property 
with others.  These cases are so compelling in part because of the extent to 
which they seamlessly fill gaps between the hard edges of ownership 
rights.  Moreover, they do so relatively unobtrusively, applying fact-
specific tests that recognize the commonplace behavior of property owners 
and non-owners vis-à-vis each other, without much pomp about the 
importance of upholding rights. 
These cases are highly successful in this respect because, in contrast to 
the nuisance, adverse possession, and trespass cases, the entitlements in 
implied easements cases much more closely complement the outcomes.  
Such remedies avoid the bundling effects of damages and blunt injunctions 
to keep off another’s land, instead granting limited rights of access and use 
to non-owners.  The remedies, in other words, require the tangible sharing 
of land. 
Yet, even in these cases, the potential for sharing is hampered by the 
formalistic capitulation to ownership norms.  For reasons that have no 
apparent connection to the real needs of the parties, courts hold that 
implied easements are “owned” by those interested in access and use of 
rights of way.289  Moreover, these determinations of ownership are not 
merely symbolic.  They produce a surprisingly bundled right of ownership 
to rights of way, which allows their owners to transfer them in connection 
with the sale of the dominant estates or to devise them.290  While it may be 
argued that such rules promote efficiency in much the same way that 
bundled ownership does in other contexts, it could also be argued that any 
additional incremental efficiency gain is irrelevant compared to the 
inefficiency created by implied easements in general.  Efficiency, at least 
defined in terms of bright-line ownership, is not the point of these 
easements.291 
For purposes of this Article, the other obvious limitation of these 
easements is that they are generally limited to rights of way.  One way to 
describe the core normative argument in this Article is to say that the 
                                                                                                                          
289 4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.03 (2013) (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) (stating that 
“an easement is a property right in the land of another,” ordinarily subject to the Statute of Frauds). 
290 See generally id. at § 34.12 (discussing the extent of easements and stating that “[t]he resulting 
aggregation of privileges held by a dominant owner takes its basic framework from the kind of 
easement in question . . . . [t]he most significant factor concerning the extent of an easement is the 
manner in which the easement is created”). 
291 The Restatement (Third) supports my analysis.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
SERVITUDES § 7.10 cmts. a–c (2000) (applying the changed conditions doctrine to easements and 
allowing for their modification rather than termination in the face of new circumstances). 
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remedial impulse underlying implied easements should be exercised well 
beyond disputes over rights of way.  Part IV advances that argument. 
C.  Remedies Redux 
The most striking means to demonstrate the ways in which these core 
doctrines eliminate basic remedies that ought to be available in property 
law is to transpose Calabresi and Melamed’s four remedial rules into a 
context more removed from the case of nuisance, which was the doctrinal 
palette for Calabresi and Melamed’s framework.  In the nuisance context, 
the four rules break down as follows:292 
TABLE 1 
REMEDIES IN NUISANCE 
Remedy Result in Pollution Control Context 
Injunction Defendant must stop polluting 
Damages Defendant may pollute, but must pay damages 
No Liability Defendant may pollute 
Purchased Injunction Defendant must stop polluting so long as 
Plaintiff compensates Defendant for doing so 
Now consider the four rules in the context of a trespass case.  By 
focusing on the italicized language in the following table, it quickly 
becomes obvious that in the trespass context, two of the rules appear 
absurd.  Specifically, it appears nonsensical to remedy a trespass case with 
damages in the absence of an injunction. 
TABLE 2 
REMEDIES IN TRESPASS 
Remedy Result in Trespass Context 
Injunction Defendant must stay off Plaintiff’s property 
Damages Defendant may enter Plaintiff’s property, but 
must pay damages 
No Liability Defendant may enter Plaintiff’s property 
Purchased Injunction Defendant must stay off Plaintiff’s property so 
long as Plaintiff compensates Defendant for 
doing so 
The notion of ownership as an entitlement precludes the possibility 
that an owner claiming trespass would ever have to share use of the 
property with the defendant, as a remedial matter.  The right in question 
automatically determines who may use the property and in what respects.  
                                                                                                                          
292 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1115–19. 
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It would be too much of an imposition on the right of ownership to allow a 
defendant to enter a plaintiff’s property so long as she or he paid damages 
for the opportunity to do so.  Such an imposition would derogate too much 
from the absolutist, and even Blackstonian, nature of ownership.293  The 
remedy is an on-off switch either in favor of the plaintiff requiring the 
defendant to stay off, or in favor of the defendant allowing the defendant to 
enter. 
IV.  A MODEL FOR SHARING THE CATHEDRAL 
The purpose of this Part is to provide a model for making good on the 
intuitions of the many judges who instinctively seek ways to allow parties 
to share access to and use of private resources.  Using Holmes’s outcome-
first framework as the starting point, the model proposes refocusing 
decision makers’ attention on property outcomes rather than on property 
ownership.  The goal is to transform what is currently a more philosophical 
recognition of “rights to share” into pragmatic opportunities to share 
private property.  More broadly, the purpose of the model is to stimulate 
the development of a much broader range of property outcomes than those 
produced by recognizing rights of bundled ownership.  The heart of this 
Part is in Section IV.B, which develops the interest-outcome model for 
enhancing sharing and other outcomes in certain core areas of property 
law, including nuisance, adverse possession, trespass, and implied 
easements.  By reanalyzing the cases discussed in Part III, first using a 
Holmesian approach in Section IV.A, and then in Section IV.C using the 
model developed here, this Part provides evidence of the interest-outcome 
model’s efficaciousness. 
A.  The Cathedral as Seen by Holmes: A New View of Prah 
The purpose of this Section is to demonstrate that Holmes’s 
perspective on outcomes allows much more opportunity to develop 
outcomes that involve property sharing and other means of more fairly 
distributing property resources.  By avoiding the question of who has a 
                                                                                                                          
293 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, 
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 598 (2008) (“For quite 
some time, the right to exclude in the context of both tangible and intangible property has come to be 
associated with an entitlement to exclusionary (injunctive) relief.”); Merrill, supra note 10, at 747 
(presenting “historical evidence [which] suggests that the right to exclude . . . is more basic to the 
institution of property than are other incidents of property recognized in mature property systems”); 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE 
L.J. 357, 361–62 (2001) (noting that Blackstone’s essential conception of property was grounded as a 
right in rem); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 
605–07, 618–21 (1998) (noting that Blackstone’s need to justify absolutist conceptions of the right to 
exclude via reference to utilitarian concerns continues to be felt in law and economics scholarship). 
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right or owes a duty, Holmes’s basic prescription avoids the conflation of 
ownership with exclusion.  The best illustration of Holmes’s different 
perspective on an outcome-centered approach is to apply it.  In contrast to 
the approaches taken by the Prah majority and minority, as well as by 
Calabresi and Melamed, Holmes would simply have skipped over the 
question of whether a “nuisance” was committed or an “easement” was 
acquired—whether someone had violated a duty or secured a right.294  To 
Holmes, these questions would be merely metaphysical, or as Holmes 
described it, “moral,”295 and it would be a distraction to squeeze the 
resolution of the dispute into the categories of rights imposed by nuisance 
and easement laws.296  Instead, by his own description, Holmes would have 
looked first at “the facts which make up the group in question,”297 an 
analysis that would have considered the parties’ “physical relation” to a 
resource “and to the rest of the world” and their “intent.”298  Holmes then 
would have considered “the consequences attached by the law to that 
group.”299 
Returning to Holmes’s property discussion about possession and 
ownership in The Common Law, Holmes would have concluded that the 
“facts” making up “the group in question” would not look much different 
between owner and mere possessor, because both would bear largely the 
same “physical relation” to the property “and to the rest of the world.”300  
To equate owner with possessor in such a way would necessitate 
concentrating analytical attention first and foremost on the ways in which 
the parties used the property in dispute.  Thus, the first question would 
likely have prompted Holmes to consider each party’s needs concerning 
the property at issue and the ways in which those needs could be met by 
access to and use of that property.   
In Prah, there was a high level of accord between the needs and uses 
that Prah and Maretti each intended for Maretti’s lot.301  If one sets aside 
the dissent’s rhetoric that Maretti, as a property owner, should have had 
complete freedom to make whatever physical use of the lot he wished,302 it 
appears that he could have built a perfectly serviceable single family home 
on the lot in such a manner as to give Prah continued use of the sunlight 
                                                                                                                          
294 See HOLMES, supra note 32, at 213–14 (distinguishing possession as a legal right from 
possession as a fact and divorcing the notion from morality).  
295 Holmes, supra note 30, at 170–71. 
296 See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 191–92 (Wis. 1982) (referring to the rights at issue 
both in terms of “nuisance” and “easements”).   
297 HOLMES, supra note 32, at 215. 
298 Id. at 216. 
299 Id. at 215. 
300 Id. at 215–16. 
301 See Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 191 (“Private nuisance law . . . has the flexibility to protect both a 
landowner’s right of access to sunlight and another landowner’s right to develop land.”). 
302 Id. at 193–94 (Callow, J., dissenting). 
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shining in from above his lot.303  It is a stretch to argue that by failing to do 
so, he committed a nuisance.  But it is by no means a stretch to say, as a 
remedial matter, that each party deserved protection for his intended use. 
On Prah’s side, the inquiry would consider the fact that Prah used his 
own property next door for a single family home that contributed to energy 
conservation efforts during a time when energy use was of paramount 
national concern.304  Thus, Prah’s position within the broader social context 
would be completely relevant to the needs he sought to meet.  It is also 
important that Maretti intended a use that is highly respected and indeed 
venerated305 and further that he complied with local zoning and building 
laws intended to contribute to longer-term planning and development.306  
But that importance can be overstated to the point of having unnatural 
influence.  Holmes may well conclude that if Maretti’s use could do all 
these things and not conflict with Prah’s intended use, then a court should 
require Maretti to build in a non-conflicting manner regardless of whether 
doing so would constitute a nuisance.  For the same reasons, a court would 
have a good basis for requiring such accommodations in uses even when 
unneighborly behavior was not in evidence (as it may have been on 
Maretti’s part).307  In other words, sharing would be a much more obvious 
and natural outcome in the absence of a mandate to determine ownership. 
So far, Holmes’s conclusions would not have differed much from the 
majority’s.  And indeed, in Prah, in contrast to many nuisance cases, they 
may not have differed at the stage of determining remedies either.308  But it 
is important to note that in the typical nuisance case, it would be at the 
point of determining remedies that Holmes’s approach would likely differ 
substantially from that of many courts because ownership would not 
inform Holmes’s determination.  In the typical case, an outcome involving 
shared use could easily have been derailed by a remedial decision to award 
damages to Prah rather than an injunction.  For Holmes, by contrast, even 
if a property owner’s use were socially beneficial, the fact of ownership 
would not prioritize this factor in determining remedies.309  As an 
adjudicatory matter, Holmes’s orientation might require the parties to state 
                                                                                                                          
303 Id. at 185 (majority opinion).  The court indicated that the exact location and feasibility of 
different construction plans on Maretti’s lot were disputed, but it did not appear that his chosen location 
was the only alternative.  Id. 
304 Id. at 189; see also Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1218–19 (2009) 
(discussing the American legal debate over the importance of solar rights in the last quarter century).  
305 See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 222, at 951 (arguing that homeownership is of 
paramount importance). 
306 Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 192. 
307 See id. at 185 (noting that Maretti simply ignored Prah’s request to locate his home away from 
the plot line dividing their properties).   
308 Id. at 191–92.   
309 See HOLMES, supra note 32, at 241–42 (noting that nature of ownership generally does not 
influence remedies). 
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public reasons why their behavior was reasonable as a precondition for 
certain outcomes. 
This would open up a range of additional remedial options.  Most 
obviously, by evaluating remedy before ownership, Holmes might have 
tailored the injunctive reach, thereby giving Prah incentive to provide an 
ongoing social benefit through his particular property use.  For example, 
Holmes might have chosen to protect Prah’s use only so long as he 
maintained the solar panels on his home.  This is something courts are 
familiar with enforcing in the context of applying the law of easements,310 
and which the Restatement (Third) on Servitudes would push even 
further.311  Doing so as a remedial matter, however, would give the 
advantage of flexibility in managing uses over time, including changing 
uses prospectively in light of long-term planning efforts.  The nuisance 
case of Armstrong v. Francis Corp.,312 is one of a number of examples 
representing the inchoate remedial potential in these cases.  Before the 
nuisance suit was filed in that case, the parties had mapped out a quite 
detailed and context-specific remedy during settlement discussions, which 
the court ultimately imposed.313 
The possibilities for flexible injunctions are even more apparent in the 
pollution example used by Calabresi and Melamed.  By removing the 
conceptual hurdle of ownership, Holmes may well have suggested an 
approach that could lead to more efficient results or to better distributive 
outcomes using Calabresi and Melamed’s own metrics, than the authors 
argued could be accomplished by using liability rules such as the 
purchased injunction.314  In the original analysis, a wealthy neighborhood 
full of homeowners could pay a coal company to install filters that would 
reduce the pollution emanating from the factory.315  The authors argued 
that such a remedy would be better as a distributive matter, because the 
hypothetical factory employed many lower-income workers.316  A 
framework following Holmes would add to the remedial options by more 
directly managing the uses made of the coal factory.  Such a remedy could 
operate by requiring that the workers be given more opportunity to choose 
uses that would protect their own health.  Alternatively, it could be a 
directive from the court that the subsidy provided by the rich neighboring 
landowners be used by the factory owners to transition to a cleaner form of 
energy than a coal plant.  The first alternative would protect the workers’ 
                                                                                                                          
310 In particular, abandonment is a basis for terminating an easement.  4 POWELL ON REAL 
PROPERTY § 34.18 (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2013). 
311 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.10 (2000). 
312 120 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1956). 
313 Id. at 7. 
314 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1120–21. 
315 Id. at 1121. 
316 Id. 
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health as well as their economic welfare.  The second would internalize 
harmful externalities by imposing intergenerational protections for non-
parties to the case.  With their interest in all-or-nothing “property rules,” 
however, Calabresi and Melamed did not focus on this traditional tool of 
injunctive relief developed by the courts of equity.317  
The point is that injunctions that avoid all-or-nothing results are far 
more likely to require all the parties in the dispute to share in both the 
benefit and in the responsibility associated with property possession, use, 
and ownership.  Such remedies can be more closely linked to the parties’ 
needs vis-à-vis the property.  Even the short list of additional outcomes 
provided here ought to hint at the possibilities for distributional justice.  
Given the costs invested in applying the muddy nuisance test, it is only 
fitting that better tailored outcomes are among the benefits that accrue. 
B.  Holmes Translated:  The Interest-Outcome Model Developed 
At this stage, it is important to acknowledge that Holmes’s two-part 
prescription is really only a beginning point.  It is an important one, but it 
can nevertheless be difficult to imagine what exactly could replace an 
inquiry into ownership in a framework where questions of title are 
deferred.  In fact, however, much of the work accomplished by recent 
scholarship in searching for a more expansive concept of property 
entitlements is particularly effective in answering Holmes’s first question.  
Specifically, notions of social obligation,318 capabilities,319 personhood,320 
democratic community,321 positive rights,322 and interconnectedness323 all 
can and should be relevant considerations in determining what facts make 
up the group in question.  By importing these concepts into Holmes’s basic 
                                                                                                                          
317 Id. at 1118–19. 
318 See Alexander, supra note 11, at 752 (arguing that a “robust version of the social-obligation 
norm explains many of the most controversial legal practices in which owners have been required to 
sacrifice either some use of their entitlement or the entitlement itself”).   
319 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 111, at 70–86 (arguing that human capabilities should help 
determine political ideals and formulate the rights guaranteed to every citizen). 
320 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982) 
(considering “how the personhood perspective can help decide specific disputes between rival 
claimants”). 
321 See Singer, supra note 111, at 1059 (noting that “the allocation and exercise of property rights 
imposes externalities on others and on social life in general” and “property owners have obligations to 
use their rights in ways that are compatible with the basic norms of our society”). 
322 THOMAS MEYER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 57–59 (2007). 
323 See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 29, at 163 (“Whether the case involves a physical 
interdependence or other interconnectedness (of an ecological, biological, economic, or other nature) 
between the interests that the dueling claims assert . . . the foundational assumption that a right 
deserves presumptive power because of the uniquely worthy nature of the values that it asserts fails 
across a wide range of property cases.”); Singer, supra note 111, at 1047 (“[P]roperty law concerns not 
just relations between persons and things but relations among persons with respect to valued 
resources.”). 
 2013] SHARING THE CATHEDRAL 705 
prescription, this Section adapts it for use in resolving modern property 
disputes.  Moreover, as the following description of the model should 
make clear, the major adjustment for property theory and doctrine is 
conceptual rather than substantive.  Courts regularly do the basic things 
this model proposes, but not for the purpose this model proposes.  By 
adjusting both the purpose for which courts should evaluate property use 
and the timing of such evaluation, this model opens a path to expanding the 
range of outcomes in property law and, in particular, to recapturing the 
inchoate power of sharing. 
1.  “[W]hat are the facts which make up the group in question[?]”324 
Recall that this was the only question Holmes proposed asking prior to 
determining the appropriate outcome in a given dispute.  In applying this 
question to his property example, Holmes observed that in property law, a 
basic consideration in defining a group that ought to receive a remedy is 
that group’s particular “physical relation to [an] object and to the rest of 
the world.”325  Holmes’s interest in the physicality of the relationship 
suggests that he shared a common understanding with adjudicators 
involved in the early writ system that the physical use of the property 
mattered a great deal in determining outcomes in disputes over the 
property. 
There are three respects in which the interest-outcome approach 
proposed here differ quite meaningfully from Holmes’s basic prescription.  
In adapting Holmes’s first question to modern property disputes, this 
model seeks both to modernize and to make more specific the common 
insight shared by the early writ system and Holmes.  Understanding use is 
still central to the task of understanding how parties relate to property, but 
in this modern world use is no longer the only basis for understanding that 
relationship.  Nor in contemporary relationships is use defined so much by 
physicality.  Finally, while it may be argued that Holmes’s “bad man” 
would be concerned only with the economic consequences of his actions, 
the model proposed here would require a consideration of social context 
well beyond quantifiable economic consequences.  Although the model 
proposed here concurs fully with Holmes’s basic point that formal title 
ought to be much less important normatively in determining access to and 
use of property than it currently is, the model does not go so far as to agree 
with Holmes that it makes no difference whether the party seeking a 
remedy is a “child” or a “powerful ruffian” so long as she demonstrates the 
requisite interest in possession.326  In the interest-outcome approach 
proposed here, that difference would be completely relevant, because the 
                                                                                                                          
324 HOLMES, supra note 32, at 215. 
325 Id. at 216. 
326 Id. at 235. 
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first step in determining the facts making up the group in question would 
be to apply the core lesson from negotiation theory by determining what 
legitimate interests to the property are demonstrated by each of the 
parties.327 
While there are disputes in which one party enters upon or uses an 
owner’s property without any legitimate basis for doing so, as the literature 
on “governance property” discusses, there are many more situations where 
the non-owner has a legitimate interest that may justify some level of 
access or use.  Where there is no legitimate interest conflicting with the 
owner’s claim of formal title, Professor Smith’s exclusion paradigm, 
relying on designations of formal title and broad rights of exclusion,328 is 
appropriate both on fairness and efficiency grounds.  But where parties 
other than the formal owner have legitimate interests to the property, the 
exclusion paradigm is not of much help, once again on both fairness and 
efficiency grounds. 
How then does a legal decision maker go about the task of determining 
whether a party has a legitimate interest in the property, in the vein of 
negotiation theory, as distinguished from the position of being a title-
holder or not?  One way to do so is to determine whether the party has 
formal title.  Such an inquiry creates a clear rule, but, for all the reasons 
discussed in this Article, if the decision maker stops there she ignores 
many interests that could and should be protected in a sharing world.  A 
second way is to evaluate “entitlements,” more broadly defined as 
Professor Singer has done, to include specific legal rights even if those 
rights do not rise to the level of full, formal rights of ownership.329  Such 
an evaluation makes sense as a starting point for the interest-outcome 
approach, both because entitlements are so often associated with and 
representative of legitimate interests and because they recognize that 
different people and relationships can coexist with respect to different 
rights in the property bundle.330  However, the cases with which this 
Article is most concerned are the cases in which uses overlap, and, as 
shown in Part III, such cases often involve interests that can be described 
as “legitimate” where the party has no “entitlement,” even when the latter 
term is broadly defined. 
Thus, this Article proposes that in such cases, the question of whether 
a party has a legitimate interest should also be investigated by answering 
three questions about the use such party is making or proposes to make of 
the property.  The first question that ought to be asked about use is what 
                                                                                                                          
327 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 165, at 35–37 (advising that parties in a negotiation should 
identify each other’s interests). 
328 See supra notes 113–25 and accompanying text. 
329 SINGER, supra note 29, at 14. 
330 Id. at 94. 
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exactly the various parties to the dispute—both owners and non-owners—
are doing with the property.  The second question would ask how the rest 
of the world perceives such uses.  The third question would seek 
information about the parties’ intent vis-à-vis the property, both their 
intended uses and their intent concerning the myriad other interests that 
define property ownership.  These three questions would be asked for the 
quite specific purpose of investigating possible outcomes, including how 
the disputed property could be shared.  A moment’s comparison with the 
evaluation of use in adverse possession ought to make clear how this 
model is different.  In such a context, use is evaluated, but neither using the 
same terms, nor with such specificity, nor—most importantly—for the 
same end.  Adverse possession ends in exclusion.  This model evaluates 
use for the purpose of sharing. 
Consider each question in turn.  As concerns the first question, it 
should suffice to say that the inquiry would not perform the relatively 
crude task of sifting and protecting appropriate uses, as in the case of 
adverse possession.  Rather, it would classify uses as a first step in 
determining the appropriate remedy for any given class of use.  Most 
prominently, it would evaluate uses for signs of compatibility which could 
lead to sharing along one or more dimensions or at least to injunctions that 
would not exclude one or more parties completely as a means of protecting 
the “full” property rights of another. 
The second question would consider such uses as perceived by the 
“rest of the world.”  Thus, the model considers these uses in the broader 
social context surrounding the parties, taking into consideration the needs 
of the community concerning property of the type at issue,331 the trends in 
development of such property,332 and the ways in which such property has 
or has not supported local and regional economic development.333  
Additionally, the model considers the needs of each party to access and use 
the property, including the capabilities that could be thereby enhanced.334  
As a related matter, the model considers each party’s moral connection to 
                                                                                                                          
331 There are many examples of this outward-looking perspective in adjudicating property 
disputes.  One particularly effective one, because of the balance drawn between breadth and specificity, 
is a recent model proposed to address cultural property disputes.  See Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In 
Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1028–29 (2009) (arguing that “legal claims to indigenous 
cultural property” need to take into consideration the rights of non-owners). 
332 See, e.g., FRUG, supra note 265, at 9–12 (arguing that city services should be transformed into 
vehicles for community building); Garnett, supra note 265, at 4 (discussing the “relationship between 
property regulation and order-restoration efforts”); Peter Pollock, A Comment on Making Sustainable 
Land-Use Planning Work, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2009) (discussing “barriers to effective 
implementation of local land-use planning tools for sustainable development”). 
333 This type of inquiry advocates, and owes a debt to, the social obligation approach proposed by 
Gregory Alexander as well as the democracy-enhancing approach proposed by Joseph Singer.  
Alexander, supra note 11, at 748–52; Singer, supra note 111, at 1057–61. 
334 NUSSBAUM, supra note 111, at 70–74. 
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the property.  Such an inquiry could encompass the personhood (and 
peoplehood) perspectives advocated by Professor Radin and others.335  But 
it would also be more basic, considering, for example, whether favoring 
one party would promote speculation,336 absentee ownership, abandonment 
or dis-use, loss of freedom and subsistence, spite, or un-neighborly 
behavior. 
Much of this inquiry would also elucidate relevant facts about the third 
question of intent, which Holmes suggests is also relevant in a property 
dispute.337  The point of such an inquiry would be first to determine the 
extent to which the parties’ intents (and needs) were compatible, without 
the gratuitous insertion of ownership predetermining the answer.  In 
Joseph, for example, it seems entirely conceivable that such an inquiry 
would find a continuing interest on the Whitcombes’ part in maintaining 
the property as a family home and passing it on to their children, while the 
bona fide purchaser may well have been satisfied with a monetary 
remedy.338  Even in Shack, it seems quite possible that granting the workers 
a more permanent right to use the property could have provided a 
meaningful protection for their subsistence while not intruding overmuch 
on Tedesco’s ownership rights.339  To the contrary, it could have provided 
Tedesco a very stable source of income.  Where the decision maker did 
find the parties’ intent to be incompatible, an inquiry into intent could 
provide valuable information about appropriate remedies.  In such a 
circumstance, the model proposed here would not shy away from making 
basic judgments about the broader impacts of use.  Rather, the model 
would urge a strong correlation between the parties’ intent and the social 
implications of the uses made of the property. 
                                                                                                                          
335 Radin, supra note 320; see also Carpenter et al., supra note 331, at 1028–29 (arguing that 
“legal claims to indigenous cultural property” need to take into consideration the rights of non-owners); 
David L. Rosendorf, Comment, Homelessness and the Uses of Theory: An Analysis of Economic and 
Personality Theories of Property in the Context of Voting Rights and Squatting Rights, 45 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 701, 709 (1990) (“The basic premise of the personality approach is that the close interrelation 
between certain forms of property and personhood justify, to some extent, the creation of property 
rights.”). 
336 I acknowledge the possibility that speculation can produce beneficial land development, but 
here I refer to a subcategory that produces the opposite effects.  See C.E. Elias, Jr. & James Gillies, 
Some Observations on the Role of Speculators and Speculation in Land Development, 12 UCLA L. 
REV. 789, 793–94 (1965) (noting that when a speculator lacks information, fluctuations in land prices 
will increase, average prices over time may increase, “orderly city growth will be hindered, and urban 
sprawl will be promoted”). 
337 HOLMES, supra note 32, at 216. 
338 See Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45–48 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (holding that a 
family that openly occupied a bungalow for an extended time period but failed to establish an initial 
claim of right did not acquire the property through adverse possession).   
339 See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 375 (N.J. 1971) (holding that a field worker and an attorney 
who entered private property to aid migrant farm workers employed and housed there were not 
trespassing). 
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Additionally, an inquiry into intent would perform the important 
remedial function of ascertaining and assessing proposed future uses by the 
parties in a dispute.  In this respect, the model would move beyond 
doctrines such as adverse possession, which do important work in 
protecting the reliance interest.  However, such doctrines only indirectly 
attempt to privilege more beneficial uses of property.340  Their ability to 
perform any real level of long term, large scale planning is seriously 
impaired by their backward-looking orientation. 
Before moving to the model’s second stage of analysis, it is worth 
pausing over the question of why an inquiry into use is so helpful here.  
The answer to this question is that it is not really any more helpful to 
consider use than the other interests associated with property.  The point 
rather is to consider something more than exclusion.  By concentrating on 
property use, this model seeks to disrupt the connection between 
ownership and exclusion.  By rendering use relevant, indeed coequal with 
exclusion, this model argues that the fact of ownership should not 
automatically dictate the outcome of exclusion.  Other interests could 
substitute for use in accomplishing this purpose.  Indeed, this model 
concentrates on use in part because of its flexibility in incorporating 
aspects of these other interests. 
It is appropriate to acknowledge here that this first step in the interest-
outcome approach requires a normative judgment about the legitimacy of a 
party’s interest to the disputed property and further that such an inquiry 
may often require evaluation of formal entitlements, more broadly defined.  
However, title and entitlements would not be the sole focus of the inquiry.  
Moreover, such an inquiry would intentionally be a relatively brief and 
quite inclusive inquiry precisely to allow a greater consideration of 
interests for the purpose of fashioning remedies in the second step in this 
approach. 
Finally, it is important to note the vivid contrast between the inquiry 
proposed here and the individualized model of inquiry imposed by the 
exclusion model.  In the interest-outcome approach, the position of the 
individual vis-à-vis a similarly situated group grounds the question of what 
remedy is due.  Is the individual a member of a group experiencing similar 
challenges in use of property?  If so, how does that affect the type and 
scope of use that the individual seeks?  These are the key questions in the 
model proposed here.  By contrast, they are often largely irrelevant when a 
court begins by considering who owns the disputed property. 
This is one of a number of respects in which starting with ownership 
gets in the way.  Obviously, the inquiry proposed in this model could be 
performed either in the context of determining rights of ownership or as a 
                                                                                                                          
340 Stake, supra note 259, at 2435–36. 
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second order question in the manner proposed by Calabresi and Melamed.  
Indeed, some of the substance that gives meaning to the interest-outcome 
model has been developed as a means of expanding the ownership or 
entitlement question in order to make it more useful to more people.341  
Doing so, however, dilutes the effect of the inquiry by prematurely cutting 
off certain remedial options and, more indirectly, by rendering parts of the 
inquiry less relevant.  In these respects, the model proposed here offers an 
application of negotiation theory to property law as a means of giving 
recent critiques of the ownership model more potency.  Moreover, given 
the reality that in the particular doctrinal areas addressed by this Article 
courts routinely engage in muddy, fact-based investigations of use, this 
model would maximize the benefits flowing from the costs of more 
extensive investigations. 
2.   “[W]hat are the consequences attached by the law to that 
group[?]”342 
The second and ultimate question for Holmes was to determine the 
appropriate outcome or “consequence” in a given dispute, though it is the 
penultimate stage of inquiry in the model proposed here.  The imperative at 
this stage of the inquiry would be to translate the information about 
legitimate interests and use obtained in the first stage of the analysis into a 
range of viable outcomes (or, in the terminology of negotiation theory, 
“trades”).343  Such an inquiry would potentially—indeed hopefully—
produce a broader range of nuanced and specific outcomes.  In the case of 
State v. Shack, for instance, the particular outcome may well depend on the 
extent to which the migrant workers who worked on Tedesco’s farm 
contributed to Tedesco’s income, the local economy, and their families in 
other countries.  These facts would define the compatibility of legitimate 
interests between the workers and Tedesco. 
A second imperative under this model would be to match injunctive 
relief to the legitimate interests of each of the parties.  Indeed, the greatest 
contribution of this model could well be to tie such interests, including the 
extent, type, scope, and quality of uses, directly to injunctive relief—
thereby allowing the natural consequences to flow from the instincts judges 
express in their search for more a fair distribution.  The object here would 
be, quite explicitly, to take advantage of the breadth of property 
injunctions, thereby recognizing both the uniqueness of property and the 
                                                                                                                          
341 Singer, supra note 111, at 1022–23; see also Alexander, supra note 11, at 749 (“Property 
rights and their correlative obligations are cognizable as social goods, worthy of vindication by the 
state, only insofar as they are consistent with community and human flourishing more generally.”). 
342 HOLMES, supra note 32, at 215. 
343 See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 165, at 35–37 (advising that parties in a negotiation should 
“identify each other’s interests, resources, and capabilities” in order to create value). 
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unique positions of each of the parties vis-à-vis the property at issue. 
It should be plain by now that this model proposes that use is not just 
an analytical tool in the search for richer property outcomes, but also a 
primary form of remedy.  There are two aspects of use as a remedy in this 
model that warrant special attention.  The first is that this model 
encourages legal decision makers to resolve disputes by promoting sharing.  
The rental of residential property in a jurisdiction such as New Jersey 
provides a good example of how to accomplish sharing in contexts well 
beyond rights of way.  In that state, the rights of tenants to remain on the 
property are so highly protected that the law substantially limits the 
landlord from deciding whether to discontinue renting her property.344  As 
a consequence, although an owner can initially decide whether or not to 
rent property, once that decision has been made in favor of rental, it 
requires sharing by the landlord as owner of an investment property with 
the tenant as occupier of a home.345 
This model advocates for legal protections of the types afforded to 
tenants in New Jersey to be provided in a much wider array of disputes, 
that is, in doctrinal areas well beyond the area of landlord-tenant law.  One 
basic example is the adoption of hybrid models that close the gap between 
home ownership and rental of the types proposed by Professor Lee Anne 
Fennell and others.346  In the employment context, this could result in 
hybrids that allow workers greater rights to use a property for their 
livelihoods, while the rights of shareholders are limited to the opportunity 
to receive income rather than decisions about whether and when to close 
down a property’s use for a particular business purpose.347  It is important 
to note in these two contexts the difference between the models proposed 
by others that focus on hybrid forms of ownership as contrasted with the 
model proposed here.  The point would not be to transfer or even really 
transform ownership, but rather to expand opportunities to access and use.  
Moreover, the simultaneity of uses is possible in more settings than those 
involving investors on the one hand and those making physical use of the 
                                                                                                                          
344 James E. Tonrey, Jr., Comment, Protecting Tenants from Foreclosing Mortgagees: New 
Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act in the Post-Guttenberg Era, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1006, 1022–23 (1993); 
Donna Rolando, N.J. Renters Mostly Safe from Foreclosure, THE RECORD (Bergen Cnty., N.J.), May 
11, 2008, at R02; see Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted En Masse: Collateral Damage Arising from the 
Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 991–94 (2010) (evaluating New Jersey’s tenant 
protections as a model for other jurisdictions). 
345 Johnson, supra note 344, at 991–94. 
346 Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1129–32 (2008); see also 
Dickerson, supra note 222, at 190 (arguing that “existing homeowner subsidies should be replaced with 
targeted subsidies that encourage people to make rational and socially beneficial housing choices that 
are not based on any idealized notion of the importance of achieving the status of homeowner”). 
347 Professor Singer discusses similar possibilities in considering the reliance interest.  See Singer, 
supra note 174, at 739 (arguing that “judges should change certain common law rules . . . that allow 
businesses to ignore the workers’ reliance interests”).  
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property on the other.  Even in the case of an owner with a strong moral 
connection to a particular parcel of land, it is quite likely that such an 
owner would not require the use of her property down to the “center of the 
earth,”348 and that a court could find ways in which to accommodate other 
uses beyond the limitations imposed by traditional implied easements.349 
The second noteworthy aspect of use as a remedial option would be 
that such use would be detached from the trappings of ownership.  By 
contrast with easements, for example, uses bestowed as remedies could be 
non-exclusive and non-transferable, yet also quite permanent.350  Such uses 
could change over time, or in response to the changing behaviors of the 
parties involved.  Or they could change in response to changes in local land 
use and development.  They could be shared between owners, non-owners, 
and groups.  The point is that the concept of ownership would not cabin 
them into a known package of rights and expectations.   
By turning use behaviors and expectations into remedies, this Article 
seeks to extract the greatest efficiency as well as distributive benefit from 
the costs already sunk into evaluating uses for the purpose of determining 
who has experienced what types of harms.  In effect, the model expands 
upon a basic device employed in regulation of commons such as fishing 
grounds, where uses are regulated by amount per individual over time.351  
By exploring the compatibility of different uses to different (though at 
times complementary) resources, rather than the same use to a single 
resource (namely a commons), this Article expands the utility of the device 
well beyond its original setting. 
3.  Whither Ownership?  Deferring Without Denying 
At some level, entitlements and duties are inevitably intertwined with 
remedies.  At some point in the analysis, an outcome-centered approach 
must include considerations of whether a particular remedy imposes 
unfairly or disproportionately on any given entity, especially if such an 
entity has not contributed substantially to the claimed harms.  Indeed, such 
an approach would likely falter more over the problem of evaluating who 
owes the remedy rather than the question of who has a right to it.  The 
problem of duty is really a more difficult one than the problem of 
entitlements. 
The model proposed here does not claim that legal decision makers 
                                                                                                                          
348 Blackstone appears to have been an early proponent of the assumption that ownership goes this 
far.  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18. 
349 Indeed, the new Restatement on Servitudes appears to go exactly in that direction.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.8(3) (2000). 
350 In some respects, then, they could be seen as licenses.  The point would be that the court would 
involve itself in shaping the remedy rather than in defining the right of ownership on the one hand and 
the license on the other. 
351 Smith, supra note 123, at 453–56. 
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should dispense entirely with questions of duty, ownership, and 
entitlement.  In this respect, this Article parts company with Holmes’s 
rather casual dismissal of the concept of duty.352  This also is a basis for 
distinguishing the central argument here from the prescriptive notion of 
usufructory rights in determining claims over water and other 
environmental resources.353  The argument is not that rights of use ought to 
trump rights of ownership, nor that ownership is irrelevant.  The model 
proposed here does not seek simply to achieve relatively permanent rights 
of use. 
Rather, under the interest-outcome model, formal entitlements would 
first enter the inquiry as a first step in determining legitimate interests.  
Then, under the model, neither formal title nor formal entitlements (more 
broadly defined) would enter into the inquiry until after some of the basic 
choices about remedy have been made.  Entitlements (including formal 
title) ought to inform decisions about remedial source, administration, and 
sometimes even form, rather than about the availability of a remedy in the 
first instance.  Calabresi and Melamed demonstrated the benefits of 
prioritizing remedy over entitlement quite effectively when they argued 
that a neighborhood of rich homeowners ought still to be entitled to a 
remedy as a result of pollution from a factory using cheap coal but 
employing many low-income workers.354  The question was not whether 
the homeowners lost all hope of a remedy when faced with compelling and 
countervailing distributional considerations.  Instead, they argued, both the 
distributional and efficiency considerations should inform the shape and 
source of the remedy in such a case.355 
The question then is when and how in the interest-outcome model to 
return to the inquiry about ownership and formal entitlements.  This is an 
important question indeed, because a careful answer can accomplish much 
in balancing the benefits gained from physical access to and use of 
property with those gained from more abstract means of investment in 
property that accompany the “right” of ownership, including the gains to 
be made from its rental, collateralization, or sale.  Without achieving such 
a balance, this model would justifiably be criticized for eliminating the 
marketability of title, which is surely one of the most powerful benefits of 
ownership. 
                                                                                                                          
352 Holmes, supra note 30, at 174–75. 
353 See Lynton K. Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?: The Need for a New 
Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 766 (1974) (explaining “the 
principle of stewardship, under which ownership or possession of land is viewed as a trust, with 
attendant obligations to future generations as well as to the present”); Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 508 (arguing that water usage rights should be allocated by a government 
permit system). 
354 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1121. 
355 Id. 
 714 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:647 
The answer proposed by this model is that the expansive inquiry into 
use promoted here would expose each party’s moral connection to the 
property in dispute, and that this moral connection could and should be the 
basis for determining how ownership and other formal entitlements ought 
to shape the remedy.  Here again, the model builds on the recognition in 
recent scholarship that the “moral” nature of human interaction with 
property is both important as a legal matter and currently under-
recognized.356   
The two contributions that this Article makes to this scholarship are 
first to draw attention to the ways in which property use can expose such 
moral connections and make them relevant to the remedial inquiry.  Such 
an inquiry ought to be detailed enough to provide basic and replicable 
information about the parties’ moral relationship to the property at issue.  
Upon exposing this relationship, the decision maker can then determine the 
extent to which ownership and other formal entitlements represent and 
protect it.  To the extent that the connection is weak, this model would 
accord such formal rights less priority in shaping the remedy in a given 
dispute.  By justifying adverse possession on exactly these grounds, 
Holmes again is the originator of this feature of the model.357  Secondly, 
property use can be a basis for building upon Professor Radin’s basic 
argument that “personal” property deserves (and often receives) greater 
protection than “fungible” property.358  Thus, in the case of personal 
property, the owner would have more complete rights of use, while an 
owner of fungible property may well have to share use rights with non-
owners or may lose aspects of her property’s use to others. 
In relying on the moral connection as a means of determining the 
relevance of ownership to remedial outcomes, this model emphasizes a 
core feature of traditional property doctrines that has become undervalued 
in contemporary property law with its veneration of the property owner’s 
                                                                                                                          
356 See PENNER, supra note 10, at 2–3 (describing a legal system of property rights acting as a 
moral system as well); Carpenter et al., supra note 331, at 1125 (arguing indigenous people have 
inherent moral rights in cultural property); Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
437, 476–77 (2011) (discussing “moral intuition” as a source of property rights); Peñalver, supra note 
163, at 859–60 (demonstrating moral bases for ownership beyond wealth maximization); Radin, supra 
note 320, at 978, 983 n.91 (applying Hegel’s “community morality” concept to personhood rights in 
property and describing the manifestation of property rights through moral consensus); Ernest J. 
Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 806 (2003) 
(defining property-right boundaries through a “concept of right”); Rosendorf, supra note 335, at 709–
11, 731–32 (discussing Radin’s “personhood” approach as a moral basis for property rights in the 
homeless). 
357 Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 546 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1988) (quoting a Holmes letter 
stating that an adverse possessor “shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown 
to a certain size, cannot be displaced without cutting at his life”). 
358 Radin, supra note 320, at 987. 
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ability to transfer property.359  By tying the parties’ moral connection to 
property to their future opportunities to use it, the model reminds us that 
equitable remedies in property law have long existed to allow owners to 
take advantage of the uniqueness of their land.360  Moreover, this Article 
argues that legal decision makers can more fully recognize land’s 
uniqueness by adding options and nuance to the spectrum of remedies than 
they can simply by protecting ownership with a blunt Blackstonian 
hammer.  Relatedly, the inquiry into moral connections can invoke the 
additional question, often relevant in considerations of equity, about the 
extent of “fault” attributable to either party. 
Finally, note that the interest-outcome approach leaves space for the 
definition of entitlements after outcome is defined.  This, then, is the third 
way in which entitlements remain relevant to this model.  Rather than 
looking for owners and assigning outcomes on that basis, this model 
proposes that judges look for outcomes and then assign entitlements to 
match those outcomes. 
C.   The Model Applied to Adverse Possession, Trespass, and Implied 
Easements 
The purpose of applying the interest-outcome model to the cases 
discussed in Part III is to demonstrate that these relatively minor 
adjustments in the substantive analysis can produce a profoundly richer 
and broader array of potential outcomes in property disputes, many of 
which involve property sharing.  To the extent there is a barrier to adopting 
this model, it is not a problem of pragmatism. 
1.  Adverse Possession 
Returning first to the Joseph case, the court began, as in any adverse 
possession case, with the question of whether the parties claiming adverse 
possession had satisfied the elements necessary to wrest ownership from 
the so-called “true owner.”361  These elements required that the 
Whitcombes’ possession be adverse, actual, open and notorious, hostile, 
exclusive, continuous, and asserted under a claim of right.362  In assessing 
                                                                                                                          
359 Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1378 (2011). 
360 See Nancy Perkins Spyke, What’s Land Got to Do with It?: Rhetoric and Indeterminacy in 
Land’s Favored Legal Status, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 387, 420–22 (2004) (surveying the long history of 
heightened legal regard for property in land predicated on its uniqueness and its importance to personal 
and cultural identity); Will Hendrick, Comment, Pay or Play?: On Specific Performance and Sports 
Franchise Leases, 87 N.C. L. REV. 504, 512–13 (2009) (arguing that specific enforcement of contracts 
for sale of land by courts is justified because of the unique geophysical identity of each parcel, the 
subjective value attached to non-investment residential, as opposed to commercial, property, and also 
possibly the connection in American legal thought between real property and personhood). 
361 Joseph v. Whitcombe, 719 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).   
362 Id.  
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especially the elements of adverse, actual, exclusive, and continuous 
possession, the court would have to evaluate particular aspects of the use 
made by the Whitcombes; but of course, it would have done so to 
determine whether to transfer ownership to them. 
By contrast, this model would evaluate legitimate interests as a basis 
for determining what outcome, if any, was appropriate for the 
Whitcombes, as well as for the bona fide purchaser who had bought the 
property from the purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale.363  It would do 
so by applying the three-part test developed in Section IV.B.  First, the 
model would require an assessment of the legitimate interests of each of 
the parties.  Given the basic disutility of formal title as a basis for 
determining legitimate interests in a case like this, the first real question 
would be whether either party had a formal entitlement (broadly defined) 
to the property.364  In most jurisdictions, even if not in New York, it would 
be reasonable to expect a court to conclude that the Whitcombes’ extensive 
use, combined with the effective abandonment by the owner who preceded 
the bona fide purchaser, might create a formal right of continued use.  But, 
without expanding the inquiry into interests beyond formal entitlements, it 
would be difficult to examine what interests Joseph, the bona fide 
purchaser, might have had to the property.  In a case like Joseph v. 
Whitcombe, this is where the very expensive inquiry into legitimate 
interests could add value that we might not find in a model focusing on 
rights. 
Again, in determining what legitimate interests exist beyond formal 
rights, this model asks three questions about use.  The first question would 
ask about the use made by each of the parties.  On the Whitcombes’ part, 
that use consisted of reclaiming the property from flooding, rehabilitating 
it so that is was no longer “overgrown,” fixing and maintaining both the 
interior and exterior, and, in short, treating it for twenty years as an 
ordinary homeowner would.365  As a result, the objective evidence strongly 
indicated that the Whitcombes had developed a deep moral connection 
both to the property at issue and to the neighborhood in which it was 
located.366  On the other hand, Joseph’s use of the property was 
prospective,367 and the court did not pursue the facts that would satisfy this 
model’s requirements for purposes of comparing uses.  Perhaps Joseph 
planned to use the property as a residential home as well, and indeed 
                                                                                                                          
363 Id. at 45. 
364 SINGER, supra note 29, at 91–94. 
365 Joseph, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 45–46. 
366 See id. at 45 (describing the neighborhood’s general acceptance of the Whitcombes’ 
occupation). 
367 The court did not describe Joseph’s intended uses of the property because they were irrelevant 
to the question of whether the Whitcombes had acquired the property by adverse possession.  Id. at 46. 
 2013] SHARING THE CATHEDRAL 717 
perhaps his subsistence needs were greater than the Whitcombes’ needs.  
Or perhaps he intended to use the property for conservation purposes, or 
for purposes of redevelopment or sale.  In any of these cases, the point of 
this inquiry would not be to rank the uses in order of preference, but rather 
to consider whether and how the uses could be protected. 
In this first step, a further inquiry would involve considering the 
impact of each party’s use on the “rest of the world.”368  Thus, in contrast 
to an adverse possession analysis, it would be central to the inquiry in the 
interest-outcome model that the Whitcombes had occupied and improved 
property that was abandoned and overgrown, that they had integrated the 
property back into the neighborhood, and that they had advanced their own 
livelihoods as well as provided a welcome product to the local 
community.369  The model would go even further in developing the facts in 
this line of inquiry.  Specifically, did the Whitcombes’ activities contribute 
to or detract from conservation efforts in the neighborhood?  What were 
the trends in housing development in the neighborhood?  To what extent 
was homelessness a problem in that place and at that time, and what was 
the overall effect of “squatting” in the area?  From an economic 
perspective, what would be the value in leaving the property idle, and how 
would such value compare to the value of immediate use by a needy 
family?  The model would, of course, ask these same types of questions 
regarding Joseph’s intended uses of the property, and the answers may well 
produce a conflict if those intentions were quite similar to the 
Whitcombes’.370  The final consideration at this first stage would be to 
examine the parties’ intent concerning future use of the property.  Note 
again the irrelevance of this question in determining ownership by adverse 
possession.371  But under this model, the answer could open up the 
possibility of sharing that could largely satisfy the needs of all the parties, 
while also contributing to longer-range planning within the neighborhood 
structure. 
The second step under the interest-outcome model would be to 
determine the appropriate remedies for the parties.  Again, one of the 
claimed virtues of this model is that it would likely lead to fewer all-or-
nothing outcomes.  Given the involvement of a business in the purchase of 
the disputed property in Joseph,372 for example, there is a hint of a 
possibility that the true owner would have been satisfied with a remedy 
                                                                                                                          
368 HOLMES, supra note 32, at 216. 
369 Joseph, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 45–46. 
370 Note here the different balance established by this model: it would respect the Whitcombes’ 
efforts in reclaiming abandoned property, but it would also consider Joseph’s plans in that regard. 
371 A minority of jurisdictions still require subjective intent, but most do not.  SINGER, supra note 
185, at 299. 
372 Joseph, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 45. 
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that protected his investment in the property, but not necessarily the right 
to live in it.  If the court found this to be true, one remedial means of 
acknowledging it would be by the use of a relatively traditional liability 
rule awarding damages to Joseph, while allowing the Whitcombes to keep 
the property.373 
By contrast, since the Whitcombes had apparently never had the 
expectation of complete ownership,374 the court may well have been able to 
protect their primary interest in the property by giving them a long-term 
opportunity to live in the property but not to transfer it by sale, will, or 
other means.  This could be accomplished by giving Joseph the limited 
right to dispose of it by sale after the Whitcombes had completed a long-
term tenancy in the property.  Or it could be accomplished by a traditional 
future interest in Joseph rather than a fee simple interest in the 
Whitcombes.  Alternatively, the court could have granted Joseph part of 
the net profit from sale when (if ever) the Whitcombes disposed of the 
property.  Or, instead, it might have granted Joseph an option to purchase 
the property if the Whitcombes ever put it up for sale. 
The point is that the range of outcomes is much broader than current 
adverse possession doctrine allows and it is by no means apparent that 
efficiency or other gains justify those remedial limitations.  Moreover, the 
examples demonstrate the much greater opportunity for sharing by 
dividing the interests in the bundle, by dividing them over time, or—more 
familiarly—by awarding damages to Joseph, in short, by dividing both the 
rights and the responsibilities.  Of course if Joseph had the intention of 
living in the property himself, simultaneous use-based remedies would 
have been much harder to achieve.  But one goal of this model is to avoid 
such examples of true use conflicts by giving parties like the Whitcombes 
the opportunity to claim a remedy before the advent of a bona fide 
purchaser with similar intentions. 
The third step would be to consider the relevance of ownership.  In this 
case, the Whitcombes, who were not the “true owners” of the property, 
demonstrated as deep a moral connection to it as is imaginable.375  Here 
too, the moral connection acted as a challenge to the monolithic fact of 
ownership.  Adverse possession law, both as applied by the Joseph court 
and even more generally, evaluates the moral connection through the 
                                                                                                                          
373 While such a result might be surprising in the context of an adverse possession claim, it is 
common in a quite similar context, namely that of the mistaken improver.  See Kelvin H. Dickinson, 
Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37, 74–75 (1985) (noting that to provide relief in 
claims of mistaken improver, courts must evaluate both parties’ equities then fashion a flexible, 
imaginative remedy). 
374 Id. at 47. 
375 For example, their connection to the property clearly satisfies Professor Radin’s notion of 
“personal” property.  Radin, supra note 320, at 960–61. 
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“claim of right” element,376 as well as through the typically more objective 
requirement of adverse and hostile behavior toward the true owner.377  By 
contrast, the interest-outcome model would use a completely objective test 
of use as a means of determining the connection.  Thus, under the model, 
the Whitcombes would have a very strong claim of a moral connection, 
which, unless the court concluded that they were also the owners by means 
of adverse possession,378 would limit the influence of ownership in shaping 
the form and source of remedy.  In this part of the test, Joseph’s status as a 
bona fide purchaser would not help him a great deal.379  But by considering 
entitlement last, the court could more likely arrange for Joseph and the 
Whitcombes to each get something.  Sharing would be a more viable 
possibility. 
An analysis of the Van Valkenburgh facts would proceed along quite 
similar lines under the interest-outcome model, though it should also be 
clear that the balance could be different both because the Lutzes’ “truck 
farm” seemed to be less well received as a social and economic 
contribution to the neighborhood,380 and also because the “true owner” 
appeared to be completely absent and its intentions concerning future use 
of the property may not have been possible to uncover.381  Given the 
court’s more standard treatment of use as something to be encouraged by 
an award of ownership so long as such use is appropriate, it is helpful to 
use Van Valkenburgh to highlight the difference between adverse 
possession doctrine and the model proposed here.  In Van Valkenburgh, the 
Lutzes lost all access to the property that they had reclaimed from 
abandoned status for their own subsistence and shelter.382  In the model 
proposed here, it is possible that questions about their contributions to the 
community as well as the conflicting interests of the true owner might have 
resulted in less complete use opportunities for the Lutzes than the 
Whitcombes may have received.  Nonetheless, this model would likely 
conclude that the Lutzes should get something.  This softening of the harsh 
effects of ownership is a critical feature of the model, and indeed one of its 
main virtues.  It retrieves sharing from the shadows and promotes a 
                                                                                                                          
376 Halpern v. Lacy Inv. Corp., 379 S.E.2d 519, 521 (Ga. 1989); Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 
N.W.2d 782, 785–86 (Iowa 1982); Petsch  v. Widger, 335 N.W.2d 254, 259–60 (Neb. 1983); Ellis v. 
Jansing, 620 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex. 1981); Grappo v. Blanks, 400 S.E.2d 168, 171 (Va. 1991). 
377 See Richard Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 339 
(1983) (pointing out the majority shift away from the subjective Maine rule and toward the objective 
Connecticut rule). 
378 Note that this model would not remove a standard adverse possession analysis in the context of 
determining ownership after determining whose use warranted some sort of remedy. 
379 It would be helpful in other parts of the test, specifically in establishing his expectations 
concerning use. 
380 Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 106 N.E.2d 28, 31 (N.Y. 1952) (Fuld, J., dissenting). 
381 Id. at 30–33. 
382 Id. at 30 (majority opinion). 
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broader middle ground between all and nothing. 
2.  Trespass 
Next, consider the facts of Shack under the interest-outcome approach.  
Because Shack and Tejeras’s claims were based on the implicit right of the 
migrant workers to remain on the property,383 this model would argue that 
such an implicit right ought really to be analyzed as a remedial response to 
a claim of exclusive ownership.  In other words, in either typical or less 
typical trespass cases, property law should be more conceptually open to 
claims of sharing by non-owners.  Trespass ought not to be a presumptive 
bar to such claims.  The question ought to be what the distributional effect 
of any given remedy is on both the owner and non-owners, on both the 
party bringing a claim and the parties defending against it.  To promote 
such a concept, this analysis will treat the migrant workers as having made 
such a claim. 
Beginning again with an analysis of the formal entitlements of each 
party, Professor Singer’s model would go a long way toward capturing the 
reality of relationships among the parties and the property in this case.  
Using his model, a court could well conclude that the workers had formal 
rights both as tenants and as employees.  Thus, at the first stage of analysis, 
the interest-outcome model may not add much more by virtue of its three 
additional questions about use.  In short, both the interest-outcome model 
and an entitlement-centered model would capture the facts that the migrant 
workers used the property both for farming, a means of livelihood, and for 
shelter.384  It is true that both of these uses were temporary, given the 
expectation that the workers would return to more permanent homes 
outside the country during the colder months.385  Yet their use of the land 
and their physical and psychological needs for shelter and support from it 
were presumably deep and extensive.386  By the same token, as the farmer 
who owned the land and from it earned his livelihood, Tedesco had a 
connection to the property that was also deep and abiding.387  Indeed, the 
interest-outcome model would urge a court to take Tedesco’s moral 
connection into consideration in determining the relevance of ownership in 
shaping the remedy.  In these respects, both sets of parties had strong and 
quite complementary intentions, as well as moral and physical connections 
to the property. 
The complementarity of the relationship was also likely what the “rest 
                                                                                                                          
383 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971) (noting that the centrality of Shack and 
Tejeras’s interest is especially evident in the argument grounded in landlord-tenant law). 
384 Id. at 370. 
385 Id. at 372. 
386 The opinion assumes as much in its discussion of the policy reasons to reject the trespass 
argument.  Id. at 372–73. 
387 Id. at 370.  
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of the world” perceived.  Tedesco and the migrant workers acted as an 
economic unit, contributing substantially to the local and regional 
economy.388  The problem, of course, was that the monolithic right of 
ownership protected Tedesco’s needs vis-à-vis the property, but not those 
of the workers.  Even Shack’s broad holding did not change the basic fact 
of impermanence in the connection between the workers and the property.  
In this critical respect, the decision could not contribute a great deal to 
enhancing the workers’ “capabilities,” as defined by Professor 
Nussbaum.389  In this respect also, the position of the individual workers 
within a larger group that badly needed protections was a critical piece of 
the story—as the court recognized but could only partially defend.390 
We have repeatedly seen courts recognize these types of interests and 
yet fail to protect them.391  As this Article has hypothesized, one reason 
courts refuse to protect such strongly articulated interests is their 
continuing discomfort with creating “rights” that conflict with those of the 
formal owner.  In a case such as Shack, the interest-outcome approach 
provides a tool for courts to create such protections while leaving 
ownership rights in place.  As was suggested in the previous Part, a very 
effective remedy in this case could have been to make more permanent the 
reciprocal relationship between the farmer and workers while still leaving 
Tedesco’s ownership rights intact.392  Such a remedy could have 
accomplished the enhancements to the workers’ civil and political rights 
(and freedoms) that were effectuated by the decision in Shack.393  But it 
could also have protected the economic needs of the workers by giving 
them a direct and continuing right to use the land. 
Moreover, by focusing on outcomes to protect all legitimate interests, 
the interest-outcome model could have recognized Tedesco’s rights using a 
range of outcomes that ought to assuage the unease that some readers may 
feel about the effect of this model on employment relationships.  By 
combining use-based remedies with more traditional liability rules, for 
example, courts could quite effectively and creatively protect owners who 
use their property in part to employ others.  In the Shack case, the court 
could impose a liability rule in the form of a set fee that workers would 
                                                                                                                          
388 See id. at 372 (describing the enormous economic impact provided by the migrant workers’ 
labor, as well as the large numbers of workers involved). 
389 NUSSBAUM, supra note 111, at 80; see also Alexander, supra note 123, at 1855–56 (suggesting 
that the right to exclude gives property owners almost total control over their assets). 
390 Shack, 277 A.2d at 372–73. 
391 See Local 1330, United Steel Workers of Am. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1265 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (describing tragic consequences to families, cities, and regions if a steel mill ceased 
operations); Shack, 277 A.2d at 372 (describing migrants as “rootless and isolated” and in need of 
assistance on multiple fronts, but failing to grant an ownership interest in land worked). 
392 See supra text accompanying note 339. 
393 Shack, 277 A.2d at 374–75. 
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have to pay for the opportunity to farm property on a more permanent 
basis.  Such a rule would protect the workers’ ability to use the property 
while at the same time recognizing the “cost” to the owner of not having 
the freedom to exclude workers at will. 
3.  Implied Easements 
Finally, the model proposed here ought to diversify outcomes for the 
better even in implied easements cases.  In Stoner v. Zucker, for example, 
where the court held that the defendants were “owners” of an implied 
easement,394 the court quite possibly could have promoted a more efficient 
and fairer outcome by requiring both parties to share the use of the right of 
way as well as the cost of maintaining it.  Such an outcome may well have 
balanced out distributive imbalances that easements by estoppel doctrine 
currently cannot accomplish.  Alternatively, or in addition, the court could 
have limited the plaintiff’s ownership of the right of way based on a range 
of circumstances that could accomplish a more nuanced investigation of 
legitimate interests than current doctrine allows.  Again, the costs of 
investigating use are already invested in these cases.  Given that reality, the 
granting of bundled ownership of rights of way, in which the owner owns 
the right to exclude others, to transfer, and so on, seems particularly 
contrived.  Instead, it makes eminent sense for outcomes in these cases to 
reflect, to the greatest extent possible, a more nuanced picture of 
efficiency, fairness, and distributional considerations. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although this Article has claimed a number of benefits for the interest-
outcome model proposed here, ranging from ease of administration due to 
the objective nature of the inquiry to better connections with social and 
cultural context, the key benefits claimed are the greater potential for 
property sharing and for more diverse and better outcomes in core 
doctrinal areas.  It is well, then, to end by elaborating the claimed benefits 
of property sharing.  In large part, such benefits are pragmatic in nature.  In 
a world where resources are increasingly scarce, legal decision makers 
have no choice but to consider the larger-scale effects of property laws.  
Core doctrines in property law wrestle with this reality by creating 
exceptions, balancing tests, and implied rights.  Although they muddy the 
boundaries of property rights, these doctrinal moves acknowledge that 
property laws cannot ignore the real-world effects of resource allocation on 
those with few resources. 
Theories focused on minimizing information costs are ineffective in 
performing this task.  Such theories work to reduce the costs invested in 
                                                                                                                          
394 Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808, 809 (Cal. 1906). 
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allowing current owners to exploit resources by allowing those owners to 
determine the best uses for the resources.  But often such theories do not 
acknowledge the externalities resulting from the broad injunctions to “keep 
out” that are required in order to minimize transaction costs.  In addition, 
such theories typically do not account for distributional injustices, focusing 
as they do on reducing costs for current owners.395 
Not surprisingly, given its orientation toward the impulses of the many 
judges who observe the real-world effects of the externalities associated 
with broad property rules, this model is an answer to the criticisms of 
theories focusing on information costs.  It is precisely the question of 
equitable outcomes and fairer distributions that this model addresses as a 
primary matter, demonstrating that in core doctrinal areas such a focus is 
both possible and desirable.  Importantly also, given the impulse toward 
balancing tests and more nuanced considerations of use and access in these 
areas, the model may well be equally as cost-effective a mode of dispute 
resolution as that embodied in the ownership model that currently 
predominates in these doctrines.396  In these respects, the interest-outcome 
approach presented here uses an ancient mechanism to respond to a 
compelling contemporary problem. 
 
                                                                                                                          
395 See supra text accompanying notes 109–11. 
396 See supra Part III. 
